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Notes from the Editor 
 
How do we define “homeland security?” Is it best addressed at a local, state, or national 
level? These are the underlying questions posed by our authors in this issue of 
Homeland Security Affairs. 
 
In “What is Homeland Security?” Christopher Bellavita presents seven defensible 
definitions of homeland security, based on claims about what homeland security 
emphasizes or ought to emphasize. Each of these definitions, he argues, attempts to find 
a niche in the homeland security ecosystem, struggling for resources that include space 
on the public policy agenda, money, semantic dominance, and doctrinal preeminence. 
The lack of a single definition of homeland security is not necessarily a bad thing, 
Bellavita argues; the absence of agreement can, in fact, be seen as contributing to the 
continued evolution of homeland security as a practice and an idea. What people, 
organizations, and jurisdictions do under the banner of homeland security is as 
instructive as how they define the term. 
 
What is being done by FEMA, one agency operating under the banner of homeland 
security, is addressed by Michael Byrne in “…And Not a Drop to Drink. Water, a Test for 
Emergency Managers.” Here Byrne addresses one small piece of the homeland security 
ecosystem described by Dr. Bellavita: the sometimes cumbersome process used to get 
aid to disaster victims. While the process may be necessary from an administrative point 
of view, the many steps involved appear to inhibit the delivery of vital resources. Are 
twenty steps really necessary to get a bottle of water to a person in need? Perhaps, Byrne 
suggests, we need to change the focus of emergency response from the process to the 
victim and the responder at the point of service. 
 
How we train and staff that response is the topic of Adam Crowe’s “National Strike 
Teams: An Alternate Approach to Low Probability, High Consequence Events.” Crow 
argues that the current approach, of providing national funding to prepare local 
responders for LPHC events (e.g., acts of bioterrorism or agroterrorism) is both costly 
and ineffective. Rather, he suggests, emergency response to LPHC events should utilize 
national strike teams modeled on the Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) or 
Urban Search and Rescue. The biggest obstacle to this program, Crowe predicts, will 
come from local leadership that has come to depend on the federal funding stream. 
 
In the quest to define and address homeland security, one of the biggest stumbling 
blocks may be a lack of cooperation among the various local, state, and federal agencies 
and departments competing for federal resources. Earlier this year, Stanford 
University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) convened a 
forum of government and private sector leaders in homeland security to propose 
specific, practical steps the next administration can take to strengthen collaboration in 
homeland security. The “Findings from the Forum on ‘Homeland Security After the 
Bush Administration: Next Steps in Building Unity of Effort,” presented here by Paul 
Stockton and Patrick Roberts, summarizes the recommendations of these leaders and 
proposes a number of structural changes within the Department of Homeland Security 
(DHS). 
 
An emphasis on the structure of organizations may be the key to our success in battling 
networked groups such as al Qaeda, according to David Tucker.  In “Terrorism, 
Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom is Wrong,” Tucker contends 
that, contrary to conventional wisdom, it does not take a network to fight a network.  
Hierarchical organizations (such as DHS), where information flows up from the bottom 
and decisions flow down from the top, have checks and balances that networks lack, 
holding members to certain standards and demanding accountability. In the strategic 
struggle between those who use terrorism and those who oppose them, argues Tucker, 
the side that wins is generally the side that best controls and limits its use of force, 
focusing on long-range strategies, such as countering the proliferation of weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), rather than killing and capturing high-value terrorist targets. 
 
Yet there is a danger in fixating on WMD, cautions Bill Tallen in “Paramilitary 
Terrorism: A Neglected Threat.”  Due to this fixation, reinforced by the recurring need 
to manage the consequences of other manmade or natural disasters, the homeland 
security community has paid scant attention to how we would respond to an ongoing 
terrorist incident of a paramilitary nature – the seizure of a school or a nuclear facility 
by a large, well-armed terrorist group. Such an incident would demand a swift, decisive 
response beyond the capabilities of local agencies. Tallen recommends the formation of 
regionally-based, swiftly responding federal forces with a streamlined command and 
control structure to address this particular threat to homeland security. 
 
Finally, and on a far more philosophical note, Philip Palin reviews Faith, Reason, and 
the War Against Jihadism, by George Weigel.  A Catholic scholar, Weigel argues for 
reason as a weapon in the current struggle against radical Islamist terrorists. Recalling 
the influence of George Kennan during the Cold War, Palin wonders about the American 
culture’s readiness to deploy reason or faith and asks Weigel to give us more. 
 
The authors in this issue of Homeland Security Affairs are far from being in agreement 
on what homeland security is and how we, as a nation, should address it.  Yet, as 
Christopher Bellavita states, “the absence of agreement can be seen as grist for the 
continued evolution of homeland security as a practice and as an idea.”  As always, we 
welcome your comments and participation. 
 
The Editors. 
 Changing Homeland Security: What Is Homeland Security? 
Christopher Bellavita 
The United States, through a concerted national effort that galvanizes the strengths 
and capabilities of Federal, State, local, and Tribal governments; the private and non-
profit sectors; and regions, communities, and individual citizens – along with our 
partners in the international community – will work to achieve a secure Homeland 
that sustains our way of life as a free, prosperous, and welcoming America. 
 – Homeland Security Vision, 2007 National Strategy 1 
 
The vision announced six years after the September 11, 2001 attacks is another effort to 
clarify why the nation engages in the activity called homeland security. It draws a 
picture of everyone working together to ensure the United States remains a free, 
wealthy, and friendly nation. The vision suggests both the nobility of our hopes and the 
innocence of an America untainted by globalism’s realpolitik.   
One still hears the question asked, “What is homeland security?” Is it a program, an 
objective, a discipline, an agency, an administrative activity, another word for 
emergency management? Is it about terrorism? All hazards? Something completely 
different? 2  
Even though there is no explicit agreement about the definition, this does not prevent 
people from having long and occasionally contentious conversations about the details of 
homeland security. It is as if we (the people who care about homeland security) carry 
around a preferred definition in whatever part of the brain holds definitions. We talk 
about homeland security and only rarely mention what that word means. If words do 
matter, if we are ever to reach the state envisioned in the Strategy, do we need to know 
what homeland security is? 
There are at least seven defensible definitions of homeland security. 3 These 
definitions – and there may be more than seven – are “ideal types” (as that phrase was 
used by Max Weber)4 and are based on assertions about what homeland security 
emphasizes or ought to emphasize. In a metaphorical sense, each definition represents a 
set of interests that claims a niche in the homeland security ecosystem. As in a biological 
system, these semantic entities struggle for resources to sustain themselves, to grow, 
and to reproduce their point of view within the rest of the ecosystem. As the homeland 
security ecosystem continues to evolve and interact with its environment, one can expect 
variation on particular aspects of the definitions, selection by others of the pieces of the 
definition that confer the most survival value, and reproduction elsewhere in the 
ecosystem of particular homeland security definitions.5 
The definitions discussed in this paper draw attention to: 
1. Terrorism. Homeland security is a concerted national effort by federal, state and 
local governments, by the private sector, and by individuals to prevent terrorist 
attacks within the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and 
minimize the damage and recover from attacks that do occur. 
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2. All Hazards. Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent and 
disrupt terrorist attacks, protect against man-made and natural hazards, and 
respond to and recover from incidents that do occur. 
3. Terrorism and Catastrophes. Homeland security is what the Department of 
Homeland Security – supported by other federal agencies – does to prevent, 
respond to, and recover from terrorist and catastrophic events that affect the 
security of the United States.  
4. Jurisdictional Hazards. Homeland security means something different in each 
jurisdiction. It is a locally-directed effort to prevent and prepare for incidents 
most likely to threaten the safety and security of its citizens. 
5. Meta Hazards. Homeland security is a national effort to prevent or mitigate any 
social trend or threat that can disrupt the long-term stability of the American way 
of life.  
6. National Security. Homeland security is an element of national security that 
works with the other instruments of national power to protect the sovereignty, 
territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure of the United States 
against threats and aggression. 
7. Security Über Alles. Homeland security is a symbol used to justify government 
efforts to curtail civil liberties. 
Why so many definitions? If we had the focus provided by a common definition, we 
could determine what had to be done to make the homeland secure, provide resources 
for the appropriate programs, measure our progress, and improve things where needed.   
In that construction, homeland security is a type of machine. It consists of parts 
combined in a particular way to accomplish a function. A common definition of 
homeland security would guide the behaviors of people who want to make the machine 
work effectively and efficiently.  
Is agreeing on one definition the only way to promote this unity of effort? 
One argument says “yes.” This is the "If you don't know where you're going, how are 
you going to get there?" theory. Absent a clear vision, goal or objective – for our 
purposes, different ways of saying the same thing – we will not have an effective way to 
know whether tax money spent in the name of homeland security is doing any good.   
A contrary view claims, “If you don't know where you're going, you may end up 
someplace interesting.” In the days following September 11, 2001, the nation stumbled 
along the edge of chaos. The magnitude of the terrorist threat was unclear. Vulnerable 
targets were everywhere. The potential consequences of more attacks were unthinkable.    
In response, the nation acted. Money was spent for policies, equipment, services, and 
facilities that had little apparent relationship to any carefully crafted definition of 
homeland security. 6  
The strategy in the early days was "ready, fire, aim.” Aiming happens after one tries a 
lot of things: Build on what works. Get rid of what does not. The process may not be 
elegant, but it is an acceptable way to discover what to do in an uncertain and complex 
environment.7 
Seven years later – almost – is the homeland security environment any less 
uncertain? Are we any clearer than we were on September 12, 2001 about what 
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homeland security is? Why is there still disagreement, even if only semantic, about what 
homeland security means? 
Homeland Security Is About Terrorism 
From a correspondence view of truth, the last question could be rephrased as “What 
objective reality does the term homeland security refer to?” This view asks if there is (or 
there ought to be) something concrete in the world that accurately corresponds to 
“homeland security.” The question asks about the ontology of homeland security. 
The events of September 11, 2001 provide a visceral answer to that question. Four 
planes were hijacked. Three were flown into buildings. One was flown into the earth.  
Thousands of people died.  
No one disputes that homeland security as a national focus resulted directly from that 
attack.8 A foundational truth of homeland security is to make sure such an attack does 
not happen again. That commitment is enshrined both in the original National Strategy 
For Homeland Security definition and repeated in the Strategy’s October 2007 update:  
Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent terrorist attacks within 
the United States, reduce America's vulnerability to terrorism, and minimize the 
damage and recover from attacks that do occur.9  
The definition is straightforward. It can be adjusted by making it clear that “national 
effort” includes federal, state, and local governments, the private sector, international 
partners, and individuals. However, at its core, homeland security is about preventing 
terrorism and responding appropriately when we are attacked.  If we are attacked again 
in a significant way, discussions about alternative definitions of homeland security will 
vanish. At least for a while. 
Homeland Security Is About All Hazards 
There are practical difficulties with the Terrorism definition of homeland security. It 
does not fully correspond to the behavior taking place under the name of homeland 
security. There just is not that much terrorism in the United States to warrant spending 
the billions of dollars we have spent.10 Many of the same state and local public safety 
professionals who are expected to prevent and respond to terrorist attacks have other 
work to do. As one police chief of a major American city said at a 2007 conference, “I 
had 169 murders in my city last year; Osama bin Laden did not commit one of them."  
Attention given to terrorism issues can be attention taken away from other work – 
like gangs, drugs, earthquake preparedness, public health services, and getting ready for 
wildfire or hurricane season.  
Another form of this position maintains that the skills, equipment, and knowledge 
needed to respond to most emergencies (often symbolized by the phrase “all hazards”) 
will also come into play when people are needed to respond to a terrorist attack. States 
and communities do not have the resources to focus attention solely on terrorism.  
Hurricane Katrina fed the narrative that the attention to terrorism since September 
11, 2001 undermined the U.S. emergency preparedness system.11 Empirically, disasters 
in their various natural and human-caused guises are much more prevalent than 
terrorist attacks.12 If we focus on the actual threats, and on the skills needed to prepare 
for those threats, homeland security ought to be about all hazards. 
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One popular textbook echoes this view. “The U.S. government defines homeland 
security as the domestic effort…to defend America from terrorists. In practice, 
homeland security efforts have also come to comprise general preparedness 
under the all-hazards doctrine….”13  
The national government contemplated changing the definition of homeland security 
for its updated National Strategy. A September 2007 “pre-decisional slide”14 offered 
language that captured the all hazards perspective: 
Homeland security is a concerted national effort to prevent and disrupt terrorist 
attacks, protect against man-made and natural hazards, and respond to and 
recover from incidents that do occur. [Emphasis in original] 
A DHS employee told me this was the definition the Homeland Security Council wanted, 
but there were a "few minor bureaucratic and legislative" issues that had to be ironed 
out first. I was told, in September of 2007, that it would be straightened out within a few 
weeks. That does not seem to have happened yet. 
Authorized or not, a definition of homeland security that includes "all hazards" is 
probably the de facto definition for many people.  
All Hazards Is Not All Hazards   
If one looks more closely at the concept of "all hazards" it does not include every 
imaginable hazard. 
All hazards does not literally mean being prepared for any and all hazards that 
might manifest themselves in a particular community, state or nation.  What it 
does mean is that there are things that commonly occur in many kinds of 
disasters, such as the need for emergency warning or mass evacuation, that can be 
addressed in a general plan and that that plan can provide the basis for 
responding to unexpected events.15 [Emphasis added] 
Therefore, "building capacity to deal with the most probable events will increase 
capacity to deal with less probable events." 16 
Some advocates of the all hazards view of homeland security maintain that terrorism 
fits appropriately within the conceptual frames of emergency management.17 This 
argument suggests that preparing to respond – or responding – to a chemical incident, 
for example, will be roughly the same if the incident is accidental or intentional. The 
argument assumes that while terrorism may be somewhat different from other 
emergencies, it may not be that much different.   
Experience suggests terrorism can be substantially different from other emergencies.  
For example, on January 17, 1997 a bomb went off outside a family planning clinic near 
Atlanta, Georgia. One hour later, a second bomb exploded at the same location, in the 
area where first responders staged. A similar incident, again involving a primary and a 
secondary device, happened a month later.18 The same tactic is commonly used in Iraq.19 
The Department of Homeland Security grant guidance for 2008, perhaps anticipating a 
probable future, emphasizes planning for improvised explosive devices in the United 
States.20 Terrorists are intelligently adaptive in a way other hazards are not.21 
Mutual aid is a core element in state and city all hazards response plans. One can 
easily envision mayors and governors not releasing certain emergency assets in the 
event of widespread and coordinated terrorist attacks on schools, malls, or other targets. 
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Perhaps more perniciously, a dominant focus on all hazards runs the risk of 
unintentionally neglecting prevention efforts. Already it is not unusual in discussions of 
prevention to hear “no one knows what prevention is, anyway; let alone how to measure 
it.” Or “we’re not going to be able to stop everything.”22 If we get comfortable saying we 
cannot stop everything, then assuredly we will be right. 
The sensibly intentioned focus on high frequency events (wildfires, floods, and so on) 
erodes over time the initial motivation for even having something called homeland 
security. Attention to terrorism risks becoming just another annex in a comprehensive 
emergency management plan. We can easily return to the days when “we lacked a 
unifying vision, a cohesive strategic approach, and the necessary institutions within 
government to secure the Homeland against terrorism.”23 
If the nation is not attacked again in any significant way, “all hazards” is likely to 
dominate the homeland security ecosystem.  
Homeland Security Is About Terrorism and Catastrophes 
The National Strategy that defines homeland security as primarily an effort to prevent 
terrorist attacks also acknowledges that: 
Certain non-terrorist events that reach catastrophic levels can have significant 
implications for homeland security. The resulting national consequences and 
possible cascading effects from these events might present potential or perceived 
vulnerabilities that could be exploited, possibly eroding citizens’ confidence in 
our Nation’s government and ultimately increasing our vulnerability to attack. 
This Strategy therefore recognizes that effective preparation for catastrophic 
natural disasters and man-made disasters, while not homeland security per se, 
can nevertheless increase the security of the Homeland.24 [Emphasis added] 
With one hand, the federal government removes catastrophes from the official 
definition of homeland security. With the other hand, catastrophes are added back in as 
a friendly amendment to an informal definition. This action draws attention to 
homeland security as something that is largely an activity of the federal government. It 
fits a philosophy that sees the federal government having the primary responsibility to 
“insure domestic Tranquility and provide for the common defence.”25 
If formalized, such a definition might read as follows: Homeland security is what the 
Department of Homeland Security – supported by other federal agencies – does to 
prevent, respond to and recover from terrorist and catastrophic events that affect the 
security of the United States.  
Homeland security is not the same thing as the Department of Homeland Security.26  
Occasionally this has to be mentioned. Even in 2008 it is not unusual to be at a 
conference of state, local, and federal officials involved in homeland security and have 
the phrase “homeland security” quickly morph into a synonym for “DHS.” If public 
safety officials think that way, what must the American people believe? 
Allegedly, Secretary Chertoff has to remind people sometimes that he is the Secretary 
of the Department of Homeland Security, not the Secretary of homeland security. In 
public presentations, he has cautioned against a “‘Soviet-style’ management, where 
there's that heavy hand of government on everything” related to homeland security; 
some matters, he has said, ought to be state and local concerns. 27  
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But the earlier discussion about homeland security as All Hazards and the 
infrequency of domestic terrorism, suggests local governments eventually may be less 
willing to carry their end of the Homeland Security as Terrorism banner, leaving the 
bulk of the work to the federal government. This is not because homeland security is 
unimportant, but because other priorities require more attention and resources.  
With some waning exceptions, state and local governments complain that the federal 
government is paying more attention to terrorism than to other domestic security 
matters.28 As one police chief said, “I have a healthy respect for the federal government 
and the importance of keeping this nation safe…. But I also live every day as a police 
chief in an American city where violence every day is not foreign and is not anonymous 
but is right out there in the neighborhoods.”29 Emergency management specialists have 
made similar arguments about the dangers to emergency preparedness of attending too 
much to terrorism.30 
It is not difficult to envision that as more time passes without a terrorist attack, and 
as other issues make claims on public budgets, homeland security for most locales will 
be understood, in fact, as what the federal government does. 
DHS seems positioned to accept, very reluctantly, this perspective.  After reiterating 
the importance of sharing homeland security responsibilities among levels of 
government and the private sector, Secretary Chertoff noted,  
There are some matters that are national [i.e., federal] responsibilities…. [In] the 
area of national priorities, we [DHS] actually have to be operators, and we have to 
focus and make sure we can do those operational incidents…. [This] includes 
securing our borders…. It includes looking at high-consequence terrorists attacks 
that could have a national or at least a regional impact…. It involves really 
catastrophic responses that overwhelm local and state government; and that's why 
we're doing planning with the National Guard and the military for the first time in 
a way we've never done before, so that in that kind of emergency, we really could 
step in and play a national role.31 
A 2007 report of an exercise simulating a nuclear explosion in an American city made a 
similar, if not more direct, observation: 
The federal government should stop pretending that state and local officials will 
be able to control the situation on the Day After [a nuclear explosion]. The 
pretense persists in Washington planning for the Day After that its role is to 
“support” governors and mayors, who will retain authority and responsibility in 
the affected area. While this is a reasonable application of our federal system to 
small and medium-sized emergencies, it is not appropriate for large disasters like 
a nuclear detonation. As the fiasco after Hurricane Katrina suggests, most cities 
and states will quickly be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the humanitarian, 
law and order, and logistical challenges of responding to a nuclear detonation. 
Yet this fiction persists stubbornly in the nation’s preparedness bureaucracies at 
all levels: state and local governments guard their supposed “authorities” under 
the federal system, and Washington seeks to evade responsibility. The result is a 
failure to plan realistically. Instead, the federal government should plan on the 
basis that in the event of a nuclear detonation, it will shoulder principal 
responsibility for all aspects of response. On the first day after the event, of 
course, federal assets will not yet have made it to the scene. But shortly thereafter 
they should plan to outnumber and supercede the state and local responders.32 
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In some grim but plausible future, the federal government may become the only player 
on the homeland security stage. 
Homeland Security Is About Jurisdictional Hazards  
C. Wright Mills wrote, “Let every man be his own methodologist.”33 The jurisdiction-
based view of homeland security analogously argues, “Let everyone come up with his or 
her own definition.”   
Jurisdictions do not all face the same threats or risks. Florida has hurricanes.  
Montana has wildfires.  Ohio has floods.  Arkansas has tornadoes. The northwest has 
earthquakes. The Great Lake states have severe winter storms. New York City, 
Washington D.C, and other major urban areas risk more terrorist attacks. Each county 
in the United States has unique experiences with particular hazards. 
If we suspend the need for a single national definition, homeland security can be 
different things to different jurisdictions. This construction can justify using resources 
provided under the homeland security umbrella for local preparedness priorities. “When 
we get an announcement about a homeland security grant,” one state emergency 
management official told me, “we look at what we need across the state for our 
emergency management priorities. Then we look at what the grant guidelines say we 
need to do. We try to write the grant so it satisfies the guidelines, but still lets us do 
what’s important to us, whether or not DHS would agree it’s homeland security.  We call 
that dual use.”34 In this view, “homeland security” is whatever it needs to be to justify 
receiving grants. 
The “it all depends” perspective may be the most accurate description of how 
jurisdictions treat – as opposed to define – homeland security. Homeland security thus 
refers to how jurisdictions actually behave rather than how a policy or strategy says they 
should behave.  It is the homeland security equivalent of “theory in use.”35 
From a public choice perspective, one would expect that officials and citizens in local 
jurisdictions have the greatest incentive to prepare for incidents that have frequently 
happened to them and are likely to happen again, whether terrorism, natural or man-
made disaster.36 Homeland security derives its foundation from local experience, not 
federal decree.  A definition that expresses this view might read: Homeland security 
means something different in each jurisdiction. It is a locally directed effort to prevent 
and prepare for incidents most likely to threaten the safety and security of its citizens. 
This perspective seems also to mirror emergency management. One author describes 
the importance of tailoring emergency planning to the uniqueness of each jurisdiction: 
Emergency planning normally begins with the identification of the disasters that 
have occurred in a community in the recent past. These are the known and, 
generally, the most probable hazards. Planners may then focus on the disasters 
that have occurred in the distant past by going through newspaper archives, 
history books, and other documents and by interviewing long-time residents.37 
What are the likely incidents that threaten the safety and security of local jurisdictions? 
One illustrative way to answer the question is to look at major incidents that have 
occurred in states. A Federal Emergency Management Agency database categorizes four 
types of disasters.38 Figure 1 and Table 1 show the types of disasters FEMA recorded 
between September 11, 2001 and December 31, 2007.  
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Figure 1. Types of Disasters Recorded by FEMA from 




Severe Storms 224 
Flooding  202 
Hurricane 105 





Technological Events 6 
Earthquake 5 
Terrorism 4 
Coastal Storm 3 
Drought 1 
Extreme Temperature 1 
Industry Hardship 1 
Chem-Bio 0 





Table 1. Frequency of Disaster Types: September 11, 2001 through December 31, 2007 
The disasters listed seem clearly within the purview of emergency management – “the 
discipline dealing with risk and risk avoidance,” according to one definition.39  
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One of the Principles of Emergency Management proposed in 2007 by a FEMA 
working group is, “All hazards within a jurisdiction must be considered as part of a 
thorough risk assessment and prioritized on the basis of impact and likelihood of 
occurrence.”40 Terrorism appears but once in the previously referenced FEMA data: on 
September 11, 2001. If homeland security is a part of a doctrine that plans for the most 
probable incidents, most of the country can safely ignore terrorism as a threat.  
The Hazards and Vulnerability Research Institute aids efforts to look at jurisdiction-
specific vulnerabilities in the United States by identifying county differences in “social 
vulnerability.” Their work examines “where there is uneven capacity for preparedness 
and response and where resources might be used most effectively to reduce the pre-
existing vulnerability.”41 The Institute also offers a database (called SHIELDUS) that 
allows one to identify county-level hazards for eighteen types of incidents that occurred 
from 1960 through 2005.42  
“Security” is derived from Latin. Its lexical roots describe a condition “without care.” 
Homeland security, however it is defined, seeks to create conditions so citizens can live 
without having to care about certain hazards.  Figure 2 illustrates how a localized view of 
homeland security – the representative hazard displayed here is terrorism – can provide 
an experienced-based, jurisdiction specific homeland security definition.43  
 
 
Figure 2. Terrorist Incidents and Clusters 
At one level, discussed earlier, “all hazards” means planning for what all emergencies 
have in common. That focus draws attention to the possibility, if not desirability, of 
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doctrine. At another level, all hazards means planning for the emergencies each 
community has actually experienced or is likely to experience. This focus draws 
attention to the uniqueness of disasters to individual communities. All disasters may 
have some things in common. But for the citizens who go through a disaster, each 
disaster is unique. In that respect, the security of their most specific and significant 
homeland – their community – will also be unique.  
Homeland Security Is About Meta Hazards 
Ecosystems have outliers, entities struggling to find a niche and survive. Tailoring the 
definition of homeland security for an individual jurisdiction is one end of a continuum. 
At the other end is a definition that focuses on hazards that affect everyone in the 
nation. 
As noted, “all hazards” does not literally mean all. Some significant perils are 
neglected. Patrick Massey has written about what he calls generational hazards – 
hazards “created by present generations ... [that] take many decades to metastasize 
before finally reaching a disastrous end-state that impacts future generations.”44 Others 
have written about “slowly moving disasters,” such as famine and droughts.45 Massey 
contrasts events "done to us" – terrorism, wildfire, storms, etc. – with what we as a 
nation do to ourselves.  His threat list includes the impact on future generations of: 
1. Growing federal fiscal debt 
2. Global warming 
3. Inferior math, science, and engineering education 
4. Decaying physical infrastructure 
5. The privatization of government services 
6. Dependence on foreign energy 
7. Aging population 
To this could be added concerns about inadequate health care, drug-resistant disease, 
food security, open borders, mass immigration, cyber security, pandemics, foreign 
ownership of U.S. debt, or other trends that threaten the nation’s long-term survival – 
including obesity. 46 
A definition from this perspective says homeland security could be about practically 
anything. One might respond, "If homeland security is about everything, it is about 
nothing." The nation has finite resources that can effectively be used only to address the 
most probable and most immediate threats.   
But can we risk ignoring generational, slow moving, or very low probability non-
terrorist hazards because they are not already in an organization’s portfolio, or they do 
not occur within an election cycle? 
What is the worst that could happen to our national security if the planet actually is 
warming, if nondiscretionary parts of the federal budget continue to increase, if 
infrastructure continues to deteriorate, it energy costs continue to rise? What happens 
to the nation’s security if a disease like SARS “attacks the public health infrastructure 
and the people who take care of the sick.”47 Who is responsible for preventing or 
mitigating hazards like these? 
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If one extends the National Strategy’s definition of homeland security beyond 
terrorism to include "all hazards" – as has been proposed – why not keep going and 
include every important hazard that threatens the nation's physical, social, and political 
security? Homeland security is a national effort to prevent or mitigate any social trend 
or threat that can disrupt the long-term stability of the American way of life.  
This definition would position “routine disasters” (such as emergencies, disasters, 
and perhaps even many catastrophes)48 as emergency management issues, domestic 
terrorism primarily as a law enforcement concern, health threats as public health and 
medical care issues, and so on. Homeland security as a national activity, and the 
Department of Homeland Security as the central coordinating element for all potential 
hazards, would transform itself into an endeavor that addresses the significant “meta 
issues” that fall in the cracks and that otherwise are the responsibility of no single level 
of government or organization.49   
It is unreasonable to expect homeland security or the Department of Homeland 
Security to make a shift like this anytime soon. But environments change. One could 
envision FEMA leaving DHS and regaining its status as a “cabinet-level agency.”50  
Preventing domestic terrorist incidents could return to being primarily a law 
enforcement responsibility.51 Airport security might revert back to the private sector, 
supported by new smart technology. Immigration, border and port security could be 
integrated into other organizations. In theory, the nation could see a once behemoth 
DHS outlive its initial purpose. A fanciful idea, doubtlessly; but what if? Can the nation’s 
understanding of homeland security transcend a comparatively short-term focus on 
terrorism and disasters? 
Homeland Security Is About National Security 
The term “national security,” as it is currently understood, reportedly was rarely used 
before the late 1940s. When President Truman asked Congress in 1945 to establish what 
initially was called a “national defense council,” the term “defense” was soon replaced by 
the word “security.” “Defense” seemed too narrow an idea. Security was selected “to 
emphasize the need for a broad and comprehensive front” to protect the nation.  
Truman’s effort subsequently led to the creation of the National Security Act and the 
National Security Council. 52  
Sixty years after the National Security Act we again have a distinction between 
defense and security. Some people believe the divide creates problems. They suggest it is 
“a distinction without a difference” to differentiate homeland security (protecting 
against internal threats) and homeland defense (protecting against external threats), 
one that “impedes the unity of effort between” the Departments of Defense and 
Homeland Security.53 
Sixty years after the National Security Act, why maintain a separation between 
defense and security?  Why not combine homeland security and homeland defense and 
call the entire project “national security?” If that were done, a homeland security 
definition might look something like this: Homeland security is an element of national 
security that works with the other instruments of national power to protect the 
sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical infrastructure of the United 
States against threats and aggression.  
Fusing security and defense has deep roots in U.S. history. Rader describes homeland 
defense before the Revolution. 
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[Early] settlers of the Thirteen colonies faced a variety of threats including 
Indians, Spaniards, Frenchmen, Hollanders and pirates. Lacking the resources to 
support fulltime soldiers, they met their defense needs with less costly militia.  
Twelve of thirteen colonies passed legislation requiring each adult male from 16 
to 60 “…to own a modern weapon, train regularly with his neighbors, and stand 
ready to repel any attack on his colony.”54   
Garamone describes how defending the American homeland from external and internal 
threats has been the first priority of the military since the Republic began. “When 
George Washington became president in 1789, ‘common defense’ primarily meant two 
things: defeating a foreign invasion and defending against Indians.”55 
Lowenberg reviews the evolution of these early efforts to protect the homeland from 
perceived threats. He describes “how the right of the states to raise, maintain and 
employ their own military forces (known since 1824 as the ‘National Guard’) is 
guaranteed by the U.S. Constitution and by the constitutions and statutes of the several 
states and territories.”56  
One could argue that from an historical perspective, homeland security and 
homeland defense have, until this century, been essentially the same activity. Larsen 
and David, writing presciently in October 2000, argue “In the 21st century, the term 
‘homeland defense’ is nearly synonymous with how we used the term ‘national security’ 
in the latter half of the 20th century.”57 It does not seem strained to incorporate 
homeland security in their observation. 
William Safire, author of what stands as the best description of the origins and uses of 
the term homeland security, suggests why the formal split between homeland defense 
and homeland security happened. 
[In 1997], the U.S. government got into the homeland act. In the Quadrennial 
Defense Review mandated by Congress, a defense panel was set up to rethink 
military strategy up to 2020. The panel foresaw a need to counter potential 
terrorism and other ''transnational threats to the sovereign territory of the 
nation.'' Its recommendation of an ''increased emphasis on homeland defense'' 
did not get much attention. 
Almost one month after the Sept. 11, 2001, attack on the U.S., the Bush 
administration established an Office of Homeland Security. Why was security 
substituted for defense? A rationale was set forward that security was the 
umbrella term, incorporating local and national public-health preparedness for 
attack, the defense of the nation offered by the armed services, plus the 
intelligence and internal security activities of the C.I.A., F.B.I. and local police. 
(In fact, I'm told by secret nomenclature sources, security was chosen because the 
Defense Department did not want any jurisdictional confusion with the new 
White House organization.)58 
Potential jurisdictional confusion is one explanation. Another reason is to avoid 
pressure to share some of the Department of Defense budget (an estimated 500 billion 
dollars in 2008) with the Department of Homeland Security (whose 2008 budget was 
less than one-tenth the DoD budget).59 
For some purposes, the Department of Homeland Security is already part of the 
national security structure.  The National Security Act of 1947 (designed primarily to 
reform the post World War II military and intelligence apparatus) notes that “it is the 
intent of Congress to provide a comprehensive program for the future security of the 
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United States.”60 [Emphasis added] Homeland security arguably is part of a 
comprehensive program.  In SEC.3. (50 U.S.C. 401a), the National Security Act directs 
that “the term ‘intelligence community’ includes…(J) the elements of the Department of 
Homeland Security concerned with the analyses of foreign intelligence information.” 
[Emphasis added] 
It is a stretch to say this means Congress wants homeland defense and security to be 
merged.  But it does present a picture of the camel’s nose under the tent. 
There is more.   
The National Security Act says the National Security Council should advise the 
president about the “integration of domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to 
the national security so as to enable the military services and the other departments and 
agencies of the Government to cooperate more effectively in matters involving the 
national security.”61 Some observers have suggested combining the Homeland Security 
Council “with the National Security Council to form a single, integrated advisory body” 
would improve the integration contemplated by the Act.62 
Viewing homeland security as part of the national security apparatus does not imply 
eliminating state and local public safety involvement, at least for the less-than-
catastrophic concerns. But after Hurricane Katrina some elected officials argued that the 
military should play a much more aggressive role in homeland security, particularly in 
response activities.63 Others counseled caution.64  
The Department of Defense however seems unambiguous about the strategic role it 
wants to assume in homeland security. According to its homeland security doctrine, 
there is a clear difference between homeland defense and homeland security: 
To preserve the freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the United States, the 
Nation must have a homeland that is secure from threats and violence, including 
terrorism. Homeland security (HS) is the Nation’s first priority, and it requires a 
national effort. The Department of Defense (DOD) has a key role in that effort. … 
Critical to understanding the overall relationship is an understanding of the 
distinction between the role that DOD plays with respect to securing the Nation 
and HS, and the policy in the NSHS [National Homeland Security Strategy], which 
has the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) as the lead. HS at the national 
level has a specific focus on terrorist threats. The DOD focus in supporting HS is 
broader.65 [Emphasis in original document] 
Attempts to alter this doctrine will likely meet resistance from defense interests. But 
future attacks inside the United States or other catastrophes like Katrina may give more 
impetus to efforts to formally integrate homeland security and defense.   
One might claim that in a time of need, homeland security and defense already are 
integrated. The same military doctrine that separates the two activities allows also for 
the military to assume a domestic homeland security role:  
DOD recognizes that threats planned or inspired by "external" actors may 
materialize internally. The reference to "external threats" does not limit where or 
how attacks could be planned and executed. DOD is prepared to conduct 
homeland defense missions whenever the President, exercising his constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief, authorizes military actions.66  
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From the perspective sketched in this section, homeland security means preventing and 
responding to anything that threatens national security. The president of the United 
States gets to say what that is. 
Homeland Security Über Alles 
Shortly after 5:00 a.m., a man and woman were awakened by a banging noise 
downstairs.  In a few moments, police surrounded them. The man was arrested, taken to 
a facility, held for five days, questioned nonstop without access to an attorney, and then 
released without any action taken against him.67 
This incident happened over twenty years ago, in Northern Ireland. One might have 
briefly thought this happened in the United States. Some people believe this describes 
what homeland security could be. For other people, this is homeland security.68 
William Crowe, a former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff said, “The real danger 
lies not with what the terrorists can do to us, but what we can do to ourselves when we 
are spooked.”69 There is a view that homeland security is a dangerously dysfunctional 
reaction to being spooked by September 11, 2001. Some people believe homeland 
security may be a greater threat to the country than terrorism. 
For this part of the ecosystem: Homeland security is a symbol used to justify 
government efforts to curtail civil liberties.   
70 
Homeland security in this construction has the status of a meme – “a replicator in 
human culture that acts in ways similar to the way a gene acts under evolutionary 
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biology principles.”71 The significance of a meme is not whether the idea it covers is true, 
but whether the idea is replicated in the culture.72 
Homeland security as a meme stands for more than what DHS or related agencies do 
programmatically. Homeland Security represents instead an admixture of facts, 
interpretations, half-truths, emotions, misunderstandings, rumors, and lies about what 
government does to protect the nation. For example: 
  Thousands of Arabs in the United States disappeared after 9/11/01. People can be 
detained indefinitely and incommunicado whether they are American citizens or not.  
Air travelers – including babies and frail old men in wheelchairs – have to remove parts 
of their clothing to prove to the government they are not terrorists. Border agents 
persecute economic refugees. Corporations freely open their customer files to 
government agents. Secret watch lists are filled with errors that cannot or will not be 
corrected. Immigration officials separate hard-working parents from their children 
because the adults do not have the correct “papers.” Racial profiling is increasingly more 
acceptable. The homeland security alert levels are used only when they have political 
value.73 Americans who have done nothing wrong have their telephone calls, e-mail, 
Internet activity and other communications monitored by secret government agencies.  
Animal rights and environmental activists are considered terrorists. Video cameras are 
everywhere. The government is aiming for total awareness of all information.  Although 
he may be twenty years delayed, Big Brother has arrived.74 
The amalgam of fact, anecdote, and myth supports a narrative that “the government” 
and its corporate masters – one definition of fascism – ignore the Constitution’s 
guarantee of fundamental liberties to serve specific political and economic interests.  
And it is all justified in the name of a more secure America.   
Corroborating arguments for this view come not just from websites that proclaim the 
U.S. government covers up the truth about the September 11th attacks.75 The 
Constitution is Not A Suicide Pact, proclaims the title of a book written by an 
intellectually renowned federal judge. Civil liberties and putative inalienable rights can 
be adjusted to serve public safety needs. 76  
"Be careful what you say. Be careful what you do," the United States Attorney General 
cautions Americans after September 11, 2001.77 The Senate majority leader warns 
"When you're in this type of conflict, when you're at war, civil liberties are treated 
differently."78 The opposition leader of the House adds his thoughts: “We're not going to 
have all the openness and freedom we have had. We need to find a new balance between 
freedom and security.”79 The president vows “we must not let foreign enemies use the 
forums of liberty to destroy liberty, itself. Foreign terrorists and agents must never again 
be allowed to use our freedoms against us.”80 Citizens agree. A poll taken shortly after 
September 11, 2001 found that two thirds of Americans would be willing to give up 
"some civil liberties" to fight terrorism.81  
Factoids like these are used to support a claim that government-induced fear 
increasingly rules the nation, and homeland security is its agent. 
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Judith K. Boyd used memetics to describe the post 9/11 homeland security zeitgeist. She 
writes how fear has emerged in popular culture as one of four dominant themes 
surrounding homeland security.  
Immediately after the attacks on September 11, 2001, President Bush gave notice 
to the American public that they were no longer safe: “The American people need 
to know that we're facing a different enemy than we have ever faced. This enemy 
hides in shadows, and has no regard for human life.  This is an enemy who preys 
on innocent and unsuspecting people, runs for cover.” This sense of an enemy 
lurking in the shadows or living amongst American neighborhoods as part of a 
sleeper cell waiting to be activated resonated through television, books, and 
images….  But there is also a sense of fear regarding our own government – what 
is it doing in secret places with secret things. When the government is not 
forthcoming about its methodology…the result is that people go to the darkest 
places of their minds and imagine what could be going on.  The result is an image 
of Homeland Security as an Orwellian Big Brother with the motto “See All, Know 
All,” taking innocent people “down the rabbit hole as a suspected terrorist,” 
perhaps even to torture them.82 
The world has seen this strategy of fear and secrecy used before.  One author, describing 
Germany in the 1930s, writes: 
What happened…was the gradual habituation of the people, little by little, to 
being governed by surprise; to receiving decisions deliberated in secret; to 
believing that the situation was so complicated that the government had to act on 
information which the people could not understand, or so dangerous that, even if 
BELLAVITA, WHAT IS HOMELAND SECURITY? 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 2 (JUNE 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
17 
the people could understand it, it could not be released because of national 
security.  And their sense of identification with Hitler, their trust in him, made it 
easier to widen this gap and reassured those who would otherwise have worried 
about it.83 
Fast-forward eight decades to a February 2008 exchange between a magazine writer 
and an FBI agent: 
"The public is never going to see the evidence we have," [the FBI agent] says. "We 
don't want to reveal our hand or tip our sources. You cannot judge the nature of 
the terrorist threat to the United States based on the public record." 
"But with such strictures," I ask, "how does a citizen become informed about 
the threat?" 
"I have access to the information," [the FBI agent] says. "I have a lot of faith in 





Contemporary writers talk about how the country is Trapped in the War on Terror, and 
describe how the threat is Overblown: How Politicians and the Terrorism Industry 
Inflate National Security Threats and Why We Believe Them.85 They describe how, 
because of Bush’s Law: The Remaking of American Justice,86 and the Terror 
Presidency,87 the nation is Less Safe; Less Free.88 The Lucifer Effect89 explains how 
manipulating situational and group forces can make good people act like Americans did 
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at Abu Ghraib and elsewhere. Another writer describes how the fear generated by 
terrorism and other catastrophes gives rise to “disaster capitalism,” and new markets for 
the private sector. 90 
As happened to Germany in the 1930s, government is becoming the people’s master 
rather than their servant: 
This separation of government from people, this widening of the gap, took place 
so gradually and so insensibly, each step disguised (perhaps not even 
intentionally) as a temporary emergency measure or associated with true 
patriotic allegiance or with real social purposes. And all the crises and reforms 
(real reforms, too) so occupied the people that they did not see the slow motion 
underneath, of the whole process of government growing remoter and remoter.91 
One author warns about the potential for “The End of America.”92 She identifies ten 
steps required to transform an open society into a dictatorship; the steps are based, she 
argues, on how this has been done in the past: 
1. Invoke an external and internal threat 
2. Establish secret prisons 
3. Develop a paramilitary force 
4. Surveil ordinary citizens 
5. Infiltrate citizens’ groups 
6. Arbitrarily detain and release citizens 
7. Target key individuals 
8. Restrict the press 
9. Cast criticism as “espionage” and dissent as “treason” 
10. Subvert the rule of law 
The author believes each of the steps has already been initiated, helped directly by 
homeland security. At present, she says, “only a handful of patriots are trying to hold 
back the tide of tyranny for the rest of us…. Americans turn away quite leisurely, keeping 
tuned to Internet shopping and American Idol.” Her concern is not confined to one 
president’s administration. 
What if … there is another attack – say, God forbid, a dirty bomb? The executive can 
declare a state of emergency. History shows that any leader, of any party, will be tempted 
to maintain emergency powers after the crisis has passed. With the gutting of traditional 
checks and balances, we are no less endangered [whomever the president is] – because 
any executive will be tempted to enforce his or her will through edict rather than the 
arduous, uncertain process of democratic negotiation and compromise.93 
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The Ecological Battlefield of Homeland Security 
In ancient Rome, major wars were often fought simultaneously on many smaller 
battlefields. Generals fighting in the middle of a battle frequently operated in the blind 
because there was “great confusion…rumors and misinformation pouring in on both 
sides from many directions.” Commanders who were able to gain the high ground could 
see what was going on in the fight and shape their strategic moves.94 Seeing homeland 
security from another dimension – in this case observing an ecosystem – might also 
confer strategic advantage to scholars and practitioners who want to help homeland 
security evolve.  
The intent of this essay was to look for plausible answers to the question, “What is 
homeland security.” I proposed seven potential definitions, some more tenable than 
others. I argued that metaphorically, the definitions help describe a homeland security 
ecosystem.95 The definitions represent interests seeking to claim resources that give 
advantage for organizational or political survival and growth. The resources include 
space on the public policy agenda, money, semantic dominance, and doctrinal 
preeminence.   
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Figure 3: What is Homeland Security: Seven Definitions 
 
The argument has been made that a single definition would be desirable and beneficial 
for a number of reasons, mostly having to do with efficiency and effectiveness criteria. 
But there is no one authority that can command everyone to use language the same way.  
Other important and often used terms – like terrorism, justice, disaster, or emergency 
management – also do not have single definitions. Yet we make progress in 
understanding and using each of those ideas. The absence of agreement can be seen as 
grist for the continued evolution of homeland security as a practice and as an idea. 
 Even if people did agree to define homeland security with a single voice, there would 
still be the matter of behavior. What people, organizations, and jurisdictions do is as 
instructive as what they say.   
I am unaware of research that comprehensively describes what jurisdictions do 
behaviorally under the homeland security rubric. But in my experience, the emergency 
management “community of interest” and the fire services tend to constellate around 
the All Hazards definition, law enforcement tends to cohere around Homeland Security 
as Preventing Terrorism, people who work for a federal agency tend toward Terrorism 
and Major Catastrophes, and the Department of Defense sees homeland security as 
what civilians do.96  No doubt there are exceptions to these generalizations. 
I have found comparatively few proponents of the Meta, Jurisdictional, or fear-based 
Security-Over-Everything views. The community that sees Homeland Security as 
National Security is also small, but in my view it is growing.   
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Independently of the work done for this paper, a colleague gathered information from 
fifty homeland security practitioners who were graduates of the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s homeland security master’s degree program.97 One question asked was “What 
does homeland security mean to you?” As shown in Figure 4, almost 40 percent – the 
largest group – gave a definition that either blended elements of the definitions 
discussed here, or did not define the term. All Hazards, Terrorism and National 




Figure 4. What is homeland security? Definitions from 50 Practitioners 
 
So what is the “truth” about all of this?  What is homeland security? 
A pragmatic view of truth can be represented by something a fire chief told me. 
“There are lots of definitions, and they will be activated at different times and we each 
have different roles to play in different scenarios.”98 A productive research task would be 
to identify the different times, the different roles, and the different scenarios that trigger 
the variety of definitions.  
One could also derive a correspondence view of the truth – the “objective reality” – 
by discovering what it is people actually do when they claim to be doing homeland 
security. That research may have already been done. I am unaware of it. 
From a coherence perspective, truth is defined not so much by its correspondence to 
an objective reality, but rather by how well it adheres to the beliefs and practices of 
particular communities of interest.99 Most of the definitions discussed in this paper are 
based on a coherence view of truth.  
 Richard Rorty reportedly said, "Truth is what your colleagues let you get away 
with."100 And if your colleagues believe homeland security is about terrorism, about all 
hazards, or other potential definitions, then that is the truth.   
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In an ecosystem shaped by Rorty’s image of truth, homeland security is a 
continuously evolving social construction, a reality shaped by social processes.101  Those 
processes can be constrained by semantic stovepipes that insist on one worldview.  
Expanding one’s network of colleagues who talk and write about these issues can help 
dissolve stovepipes. Such conversations will contribute to the continued evolution of the 
homeland security ecosystem. 
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…And Not a Drop to Drink. 
Water, a Test for Emergency Managers 
Michael Byrne 
Water is the most basic and essential ingredient of life, so it is appropriate that 
the ability to get water to victims is the litmus test of success or failure of a 
disaster response. Too often, we fail the test because of the emergency 
management process imposed on something as simple as water. 
Most Americans don’t give much thought to water in normal times. For the 
most part, clean water is there when we want it. Turn on the tap and it flows 
easily. Walk into just about any store and it is there, in pints, quarts, liters or 
gallons – from mountain springs, Alpine snow melt, or Fijian aquifers. Trucks 
deliver five-gallon bottles to our offices. 
When disaster strikes, however, we realize how precious clean water can be. 
And Americans expect their emergency managers to be able to deliver when the 
local water company cannot. 
Most Americans would find it surprising to know that the process used to 
deliver water to a disaster scene has a complexity that could rival a space launch. 
While there are always variations in most cases, let us take a moment or two to 
consider the process, in hopes we will find lessons for all emergency 
management. 
First, the local community hit by the disaster must decide if water is needed, if 
they can supply it without outside help and, if not, where to seek help.1 
Should local officials decide they cannot supply water, the chief elected officer 
in the community must declare an emergency. That declaration is more than just 
asking for help. It requires a legal document signed by the mayor or other official 
to be sent to the next level of government. In some cases it is sent from a city to a 
county, or a town or village to a parish. 
At the next level the process repeats: the county or parish executive must 
determine what is needed and if it can be supplied locally. If not, it must declare 
an emergency and look to the next level of government – usually the state or 
commonwealth. 
Now we need a state governor to declare an emergency, in order to ask the 
federal government to get involved. In our federal system, only the states can ask 
the federal government for help. You might assume this is a simple decision – but 
consider that we are expecting elected officials to make a legal statement that 
says, in essence: “I have a problem in the state I’m supposed to be running, and I 
can’t manage to send a bottle of water to a disaster victim.” 
Think for a moment about our fifty governors. They hold very powerful 
positions, and generally earn our respect and admiration. I have had the 
opportunity to work for a number of governors and have been impressed with 
their management and leadership skills. These are not weak men and women. 
They are strong, determined managers who take seriously their responsibilities to 
their state. 
To get federal help in an emergency, however, the governor must write a letter 
to the president of the United States, saying “this condition our state finds itself 
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in has overwhelmed us, and we don’t have the resources to respond.” That is not 
an easy letter for a governor to write, and they never see it as a trivial matter. 
Once the governor writes to the president, the letter usually will make its way 
to the Federal Emergency Management Agency, in particular the FEMA 
“declaration” office. Officials there consider the request and determine if it is 
actually true. I find this particular part of the process hard to accept – if a 
governor has taken the dramatic step of acknowledging helplessness, should 
some federal bureaucrat really be able to second-guess what is needed from 
hundreds of miles away? 
Still, our current process requires FEMA to evaluate the preliminary damage 
assessments to determine whether or not a need really exists, even though the 
governor has risked his or her political future to declare the need exists. 
If FEMA sees the need, the president is likely to declare either an emergency or 
a major disaster, depending on the severity of what is found on the scene. Either 
one will trigger the ability to supply water. Remember, we’re this far along in the 
process and we still have not provided an ounce to those in need. 
The emergency or disaster declaration allows FEMA to begin working. A 
forward joint field office is established, a federal coordinating officer is 
designated to head a command structure under the well-practiced process of the 
National Incident Management System, or City Incident Management System or 
State Incident Management System or whatever flavor incident management 
system you want. You would think at this point in time, after what our entire 
nation has been through, that we could agree on a single process to work 
together.   
There are fifteen “emergency support functions” in NIMS, and one of them has 
responsibility to supply water. Now delivery mechanisms must be identified, the 
cost of the requirement has to be estimated, and the operations chief must issue a 
“mission assignment” to the appropriate federal agency or agent to supply water. 
While FEMA has recently pulsed up its stockpile of water and can meet the 
immediate demand better than it ever has, the fundamental water supplier in the 
federal family comes under emergency support function number three, “public 
works,” and the lead federal agency for that is the United States Army Corps of 
Engineers.2 I must say the first time I learned this, I was a bit puzzled.  I knew the 
Corps of Engineers was famous for redirecting rivers, building levees, building 
dams, and generally performing feats that change the face of our nation – but 
who knew they were in the bottled water business? 
Actually, the Corps of Engineers doesn’t directly provide bottles of water. But 
they do have contracting vehicles in place that allow them to take the mission 
assignment, which will have a dollar amount based on the amount of water 
needed and an estimate of how long it is needed. Those contracting vehicles will 
allow the Corps to begin the process of supplying water to people in the disaster 
area. 
Even though the contracting vehicles are already in place, the process takes 
several days to begin supplying water, and once started, it takes a few days to stop 
after the need ends. And you better believe it’s costly. It is not as simple as 
loading an Army truck from some stockpile and driving to the scene. Because the 
Corps of Engineers doesn’t bottle water, they must first go to a manufacturer who 
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does. Then they enlist the emergency support function number one, 
transportation, to help pick up from the supplier and deliver to the disaster area. 
Our bottle is still not in the hands of a thirsty victim, however, because the 
federal government will only deliver to a distribution point within the affected 
state. It is still the state’s responsibility to deliver it to the “point of service” – 
what most of us would call a thirsty person. 
While I readily admit the process can and does vary, the essential point I make 
here is valid. Believe it or not, there are steps that – under certain circumstances 
– would be needed in addition to what is presented here. There are multiple 
people involved all along the way, paperwork to file, boxes to check, and forms to 
fill out. To actually execute the process is much more complicated than I’ve 
described. Hard-working and resourceful emergency management professionals 
find ways to speed up the process and we are blessed with their ingenuity and 
courage to find a better way. But at the end of the day, this is how the plan is 
designed to work. 
Remember, each one of these steps costs money and takes time. Agencies and 
individuals must be compensated for their time, there are travel costs to get water 
teams in place, there are rental fees for housing and office space and warehouse 
space – all before you even get to the cost of the water.  
It is clear by looking at the long twisted road of our bottle of water that we are 
overdue for a rigorous performance evaluation of disaster response. Good 
businesses in this country have learned the value of performance evaluation tools 
and there are many valid methods. Six Sigma and Lean process reviews are 
examples of the types of tools that can help emergency managers.3 
In its basic form, a Lean review begins with the steps of a process completely 
laid out on paper. Then a question is asked about each individual step: “Does this 
step add value; does it improve the process?” If it does not help our efforts, it is 
clear the step should be eliminated. The second question, if the step does add 
value, is “What is the cost in time and money?” and then, “Is the added value 
worth the cost?” 
Consider again the steps to get a bottle of water to a disaster victim. Can we 
honestly say each of the steps adds value, and is worth the cost? The current 
process might eventually get water to a thirsty person, but it is an awfully 
expensive bottle. 
Clearly, many of these steps are not necessary if we change the focus from the 
process to the victim and the responder at the point of service. Who really wants 
to argue that twenty steps are necessary to take care of water? 
For a better option, let us look at the hurricane season of 2004 in Florida, 
where one of the most accomplished emergency managers in the country, Craig 
Fugate, began asking himself the cost and value questions because of his 
fiduciary responsibility to the state of Florida. As an emergency manager, he 
knows that even though the federal government offers disaster assistance, there 
is a cost to the state and city – about twenty-five cents for every dollar of aid.   
During a conversation with Fugate. he shared with me that he started asking 
himself if that 25 percent of what the federal government proposed to spend on 
water was worth what the state would get. When he considered other options, he 
realized there were facilities like Wal-Marts and Home Depots around the state, 
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and if he could spend a little money to do whatever it took to allow them to 
operate – simple things like providing extra security, lifting weight restrictions, 
or providing curfew passes – the local stores would take care of the water. 
“The point is, getting a store open is a better solution than trying to replicate 
its function,” Fugate says. “We still provide bottled water in areas where there are 
no stores, the stores were destroyed, or to folks who cannot get to the store or 
afford basic supplies like water.” 
Fugate’s two- or three-step solution took the problem and put it in the hands 
of organizations whose day-to-day business is supplying water and food to the 
community. It didn’t require new distribution points, a complicated paperwork 
and personnel chain or special contracting mechanisms – and the water got to 
thirsty people quicker and at less cost. 
In the 14th-century, English logician and Franciscan friar William of Ockham 
came up with the concept of parsimony or in other words the intriguing idea that, 
“All other things being equal, the simplest solution is the best."4 What better 
time, no, what more essential time, is there for us to heed this concept than when 
people are in need.  It is my hope we will all remember the story as we evaluate 
how we respond to all aspects of an emergency, for it is not only this process that 
is in need of a review. It doesn’t have to be as complicated or as costly as we make 
it. We have got what is takes to do this, both in resources and expertise; what is 
needed is the resolve. A rigorous process review is really worth the effort – before 
the next disaster strikes. 
 
 
Michael Byrne is senior vice president at ICF International in Fairfax, Virginia. He was 
formerly FEMA operations chief in New York and has served as federal coordinating 
officer in multiple disaster responses. 
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National Strike Teams: An Alternate Approach to  
Low Probability, High Consequence Events 
Adam Crowe 
Emergency managers face many challenges regardless of the size or location of 
their jurisdiction. Traditional threats such as hurricanes, flooding, tornados, 
wildfires, and earthquakes are quickly being joined by newer threats that are 
potentially high-impact, but very unlikely to occur. Examples of these low 
probability, high consequence (LPHC) events include foreign animal disease, 
bioterrorism, mass care for special needs populations, pandemic influenza, mass 
fatality incidents, terrorism, and other catastrophic events. Although all hazards 
impact the physical, social, and economic welfare of the affected community, 
these high-impact events are catastrophic in nature and can result in significant 
loss of life, considerable physical destruction, massive economic volatility, and 
widespread public panic. However, unlike the traditional hazards that are 
identified in a given community, LPHC events are rare occurrences and 
extremely unlikely to occur in local communities. 
Unfortunately, local emergency managers are often limited by lack of funding 
or dependency on grants, which can lead to planning and preparedness 
challenges.1  Moreover, emergency managers are often also hampered by political 
hurdles including unsupportive political supervision and multiple job functions 
covered by one person.2 These types of limitations make response to any 
challenge difficult, much less responding to an event with the scope and scale of 
an LPHC incident. 
Regardless of size or capability, emergency managers must also coordinate 
county-wide application and compliance to the National Incident Management 
System (NIMS) and the Incident Command System (ICS),3 which fundamentally 
call for emergency planning at the lowest possible level with flexibility and 
expansion to meet the needs of escalating incidents. Local communities respond 
until their resources are exhausted, at which time the surrounding jurisdictions 
supplement this response. A similar expansion occurs from county government 
to state government and state government to federal government. This concept of 
operational expansion is fundamental to an effective response that is accountable 
and efficient. 
Unfortunately, unlike traditional events, LPHC incidents cannot be planned 
for in this way. LPHC events can be rare events or common occurrences (ex: 
tornados and hurricanes) of an extremely rare severity.  Moreover, LPHC events 
can be limited to a local community (the EF-5 tornado in Greensburg, KS in 
2007), regionalized (Hurricane Katrina in 2005) or geographically dispersed (the 
anthrax attacks of 2001). Regardless of the impact size of the LPHC event, the 
local resources and management capability of the impacted communities were 
immediately exceeded. Consequently, surrounding areas (or even states) had to 
send resources to these areas for response and recovery efforts. These support 
resources were often accompanied by well-trained teams, crews, or squads that 
were directed to perform specialized functions such as water rescue, 
decontamination, mass care, incident management, and debris removal.4 This 
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kind of specialized support to the impacted local communities better enables 
them to use their remaining response components to restore basic infrastructure 
such as public safety and utilities. 
Considering how unlikely LPHC events are, it is difficult for many 
communities to successfully prepare for these types of events. As already 
established, the multitude of responsibilities most often tasked to emergency 
managers and emergency responders make it almost impossible to dedicate time 
to training and preparedness for LPHC events. Moreover, the cost of personnel 
training time and the necessary specialized equipment is an economic 
impossibility for the average community, which explains why most local response 
teams (ex: HazMat or S.W.A.T.) are shared as a regional or state asset.5 
One example of the resource and personnel burden required to prepared for 
LPHC events is how first responders prepare for inhaled health hazards such as 
anthrax, smallpox, influenza, and other biological and chemical agents. OSHA 
and the CDC recommend, at minimum, N-95 particle respirator masks as an 
appropriate level of personal protection for respiratory threats including many of 
the bioterrorism agents. Certification to wear N-95 (or higher) respirator 
protection includes annual medical clearance and fit testing for each wearer.6 
Consequently, employers – including local first responders – must now dedicate 
personnel time to perform this function, monitor it, and absorb costs related to 
the purchase of masks to ensure the proper functionality. Moreover, these masks 
are meant to be worn once and then disposed of appropriately. Even if they 
functionally could be reused, it would be a planning fallacy for local emergency 
planners to make this assumption.  Consequently, even moderately-priced masks 
can cost thousands of dollars if purchased by a local community in an attempt to 
prepare the local staff. As already stated, this type of financial burden is very 
difficult for an average community. 
Another challenge for local communities, particularly those with significant 
livestock populations, is how to prepare for the threat of agroterrorism.  If an act 
of agroterrorism was executed at a given livestock farm, a multitude of cascading 
events would transpire, potentially threatening $200 billion in annual gross farm 
sales.9 Specifically, all exposed animals – including those that had been shipped 
elsewhere – would need to be culled immediately. This type of swift action might 
also necessitate the stopping of livestock transport throughout the community, 
county, or even state. Local livestock owners, much less the local emergency 
manager, might be challenged to understand the full implications of the 
necessary actions. Quick action is necessary to minimize the economic impact, 
not only locally but throughout the national farm-to-table continuum.7 This type 
of LPHC event would immediately overwhelm even the most knowledgeable and 
prepared local community because of the specific knowledge needed, required 
speed of action, and the breadth of impact8 
 
Given the local limitations of training, equipping, and preparing local emergency 
responders for an LPHC event and the low threat level, an alternative approach 
should be considered for response to LPHC incidents. This alternative approach 
is to create national strike teams similar to DMAT, DMORT, and Urban Search 
and Rescue (USAR) that would address the specific types of LPHC events that 
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could occur. Disaster Medical Assistance Teams (DMAT) are comprised of 
professional and para-professional medical personnel who provide a rapid-
response element to supplement local medical care until other regional, state, or 
federal resources can be mobilized to address the given disaster.9 Likewise, 
Disaster Mortuary Assistance Teams (DMORT) are composed of private citizens 
with particular mortuary experience who are deployed, supervised, and 
compensated by the federal government to provide assistance during mass 
fatality events.10 USAR teams also provide local extrication and medical 
stabilization of individuals who are trapped in collapsed areas as a result of a 
natural disaster such as a tornado, earthquake, or technology failure.11 
The effectiveness of DMAT, DMORT, and USAR crews is well documented. For 
example, the Missouri DMAT team successfully established special-needs 
shelters in Springfield, Missouri, after a devastating ice storm flattened the local 
infrastructure.  Likewise, DMORT teams have found similar success in responses 
to terrorism, flash floods, tornados, hurricanes, and technological failures.12 The 
twenty-five federal USAR teams established since 1989 have been activated for 
LPHC events such as the Oklahoma City Bombing (1995) and the collapse of the 
World Trade Center towers (2001).  These types of national strike teams serve as 
successful models for other LPHC events. 
For example, rather than spending an estimated ten billion dollars nationally 
to achieve basic bioterrorism preparedness,13 national mass prophylaxis strike 
teams could be created and mobilized in association with activation of the 
Strategic National Stockpile. Each team would be comprised of individual experts 
who receive training, support, and equipment to establish regionalized national 
teams. These national mass prophylaxis strike teams would be moved into areas 
impacted by a bioterrorism attack to provide life-saving medications within the 
necessary window of twenty-four to forty-eight hours. This would eliminate the 
possibility that local jurisdictions are unable to provide the equipment and 
personnel to execute mass prophylaxis in the timeframe required to be life-saving 
(for example, exposure to anthrax requires high-dose antibiotics within forty-
eight hours).14 Moreover, if these national prophylaxis strike teams lead the 
operation, local assets, including personnel, can be better utilized in positions 
that only require basic just-in-time training. Therefore, rather than diversifying 
the experience, training, and planning over cities, counties, and states throughout 
the United States, these national prophylaxis team would centralize these assets, 
thus becoming much more operationally effective and fiscally responsible.   
Like the mass prophylaxis teams, agroterrorism preparedness also has its 
challenges. Starting in 2004, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security awarded 
approximately three million dollars to fourteen colleges and universities to create 
Agroterrorism Preparedness Centers. The goal for these centers was to train 
300,000 first responders and 20,000 master trainers in agroterrorism 
preparedness and response.15 Unfortunately, much like the bioterrorism 
preparedness funding, this type of training and preparedness has spread the 
knowledge and experience too thin. As previously discussed, local community 
emergency responders – even if trained – cannot handle LPHC events like 
agroterrorism in their communities without the support of specialized teams 
deployed from other areas, states, or the federal government. The monies 
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dedicated to agroterrorism training schools would be better utilized if these 
schools were training and supporting national agroterrorism strike teams. 
 
The creation and support of national strike teams would result in an operational 
and policy paradigm shift. From an operational perspective, emergency 
management is fundamentally a local event; that pattern must be adjusted to 
plan for the activation and use of a national strike team trained to respond to 
particular LPHC events. Local community leadership would also have to accept 
the loss of annual funding streams that have provided benefits to local emergency 
management and response agencies. Losing the funding streams meant to 
prepare local communities for LPHC events would be particularly difficult for 
these communities, considering the strong secondary applications and uses that 
funding provides (such as extra training, multi-function equipment, and 
additional emergency management personnel). Although both represent 
significant changes, the potential local economic loss is a more significant 
challenge than the operational changes and probably would be fought by elected 
officials from the funded areas. 
 
In conclusion, while billions of dollars have been distributed to local 
communities and states to prepare for LPHC events, the results are inconclusive. 
For instance, one study identified that 54 percent of Americans felt the country 
was less prepared for an act of terrorism than before the September 11 attacks on 
the World Trade Center and Pentagon.16 This inconsistency is a result of 
spreading the funding and preparedness over too many communities, thus 
diluting the overall effectiveness in preparing to respond to high-impact events 
that are very unlikely to occur. However, national strike teams like DMAT, 
DMORT, and USAR have provided quick and effective response to LPHC 
incidents including terrorism and technology failures. Consequently, the concept 
of adding additional national strike teams should be evaluated by FEMA and 
various large emergency management associations such the International 
Association of Emergency Managers (IAEM) and the National Emergency 
Management Agency (NEMA). By working cooperatively, these agencies could 
fully evaluate the effectiveness of the current operational and funding paradigm 
for LPHC events and assess whether the national strike team model, as described, 
is a more effective approach to preparedness and response. 
 
 
Adam Crowe currently serves as the homeland security planner for Johnson County 
(KS) Emergency Management and Homeland Security.  Previously he served as the 
emergency response and information coordinator for the Platte County (MO) Health 
Department.  He is a Certified Emergency Manager (CEM) and holds a master’s degree 
in public administration from Jacksonville State University as well as a bachelor’s 
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Homeland security remains a house divided. Within the Department of Homeland 
Security (DHS), a weak, understaffed system exists to guide and integrate its twenty-
two agencies, leaving them to work at cross-purposes rather than as a unified team. 
The collaborative relationship between DHS and its state and local partners is also in 
urgent need of repair. On an issue-by-issue, month-to-month basis, the effectiveness 
of their cooperation swings from excellent to disastrous. Government efforts to 
impose regulations on the private sector pose still deeper problems for building 
collaboration in homeland security. 
These problems can be solved. Stanford University’s Center for International 
Security and Cooperation (CISAC) convened a forum of government and private 
sector leaders in homeland security to propose specific, practical steps that the next 
administration can take to strengthen collaboration in homeland security. This 
report summarizes their recommendations and proposes a number of structural 
changes within DHS to provide for better integration across agency lines and to help 
overcome the agency “stovepiping” that has plagued DHS since its inception. This 
report also examines how the next administration can restructure DHS to transform 
state and local collaboration into a sustained, department-wide priority.  
Opportunities to strengthen collaboration between government and the private 
sector are especially promising. DHS has developed a new “sector partnership” 
model for collaboration in infrastructure protection that should be applied far more 
broadly. Rather than bringing private companies into the development of industry 
regulations at the back end of the process, when DHS officials had already made key 
decisions, the DHS sector partnership model begins that dialogue early so that 
consensus building proceeds from the outset. The next administration should adapt 
this model to strengthen collaborative planning, not only with the private sector but 
also with states and localities in a sustained and institutionalized way. 
Section one of this report examines why the Bush administration has found it so 
difficult to build unity of effort: that is, coordination and cooperation by the 
disparate partners in homeland security to accomplish mutually agreed objectives.  
Section two summarizes how the Stanford forum participants assessed the current 
level of unity of effort within DHS and proposes additional steps for the next 
administration to pursue. Section three examines lessons learned from the 
Department of Defense (DOD) to strengthen unity of effort in homeland defense and 
security. Section four addresses unity of effort problems and solutions for states and 
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localities. Section five focuses on private sector issues. Section six offers additional 
recommendations to restructure the homeland security system. 
I. WHAT IS UNITY OF EFFORT, AND WHY SHOULD WE WANT IT?  
Participants agreed that a defining feature of the homeland security system is the 
lack of hierarchy between its components. As one participant put it: “Governors 
don’t work for the president, and mayors really, really don’t work for governors.”  
Successful strategies to build unity of effort across levels of government, and 
between government and the private sector, must take this absence of hierarchy into 
account.  It would be especially mistaken to replicate the top-down, command-style 
approach to unity of effort that characterizes the Department of Defense (DOD).  
DOD is strongly hierarchical, in that everyone ultimately reports to the president in 
his capacity as commander in chief. The realm of homeland security is far less 
hierarchical, not only in the independently-elected status of governors and mayors as 
the chief executives within their jurisdictions, but also in the critical role played by 
private companies (which report to their shareholders).  
State and local participants maintained that officials in DHS and elsewhere too 
often assume that unity of effort means states and localities should do as the federal 
government directs. As one participant noted, “Folks inside the Beltway think that 
unity of effort means the Feds get to tell everyone else what to do.” Consensus 
quickly emerged that effective unity of effort will only emerge when the 
“stakeholders” in homeland security – federal, state, local, and private sector – help 
formulate the goals that the stakeholders will jointly pursue and reach consensus on 
the means to achieve them.   
Participants noted that any such inclusive system will inevitably be more 
cumbersome and difficult to manage than a top-down system. One participant 
argued that at the federal level alone, so many departments already contribute to 
homeland security decision-making that the resulting policy process is like “a big 
goulash, a gumbo. There’s nothing clear about it anymore, and everything I do has to 
be a compromise with 1,000 other federal guys.” Integrating states, localities, and 
the private sector more fully than is currently the case will multiply those problems 
of policy coordination. Yet, there was broad consensus that building a more inclusive 
policymaking system is essential to sustain homeland security programs and 
capabilities over the long haul.  Much of the remainder of the forum focused on how 
to restructure the homeland security system accordingly, especially in those realms 
where progress to date has been inadequate – and even retrograde. 
From the outset, however, forum participants also noted that two overarching 
problems impede efforts to achieve unity of effort. First, fundamental disagreement 
persists over the definition of homeland security and the missions it should 
comprise, with destructive effects on institutional integration. Participants noted 
that the 2002 U.S. Homeland Security Strategy defines homeland security 
exclusively in terms of terrorism, and excludes natural hazards preparedness from 
missions encompassed by the term; the October 2007 Homeland Security Strategy 
retains that definition. A number of participants argued that by continuing to define 
homeland security exclusively in terms of terrorism, the new strategy exacerbates the 
difficulties of building unity of effort at federal and state levels. One participant, for 
example, noted that there was a continuing “war” in California between the 
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bureaucracies responsible for emergency management (which includes 
responsibilities for natural hazards) and homeland security. Similar conflicts have 
emerged within DHS in terms of the organizational status of FEMA within the 
department and the relative importance of natural hazards in DHS planning 
scenarios and resource allocation. A number of participants argued that bringing 
natural hazards into the core definition of homeland security will be a prerequisite 
for progress in building unity of effort.  
A second, related problem lies in the priorities that ought to drive homeland 
security.  Drawing on the arguments made by Stephen Flynn in The Edge of Disaster 
and Charles Perrow in The Next Catastrophe, many participants argued that 
homeland security policymakers should focus more heavily on threats apart from 
terrorism, including the risks of industrial accidents and breakdowns in U.S. critical 
infrastructure. Other participants disagreed. Restructuring the policymaking process 
to strengthen unity of effort will not diminish such disagreements over homeland 
security priorities. On the contrary: making the process more inclusive, so that all 
the key partners in homeland security can help determine their shared objectives, 
will bring a more diverse set of perspectives and priorities to bear on U.S. policy than 
is currently the case. Disagreements that are currently resolved (or at least papered 
over) by executive fiat would come out into the open. The benefit of a more inclusive 
system, of course, is that the objectives that do emerge from the process will have 
buy-in from those responsible for implementing the goals. Indeed, given the lack of 
hierarchy in the homeland security system, such buy-in will be essential if the next 
administration hopes to sustain homeland security capabilities for the long haul.  
II. UNITY OF EFFORT IN DHS: PROGRESS AND REMAINING 
CHALLENGES 
Participants concurred that the next administration should do much more to 
integrate DHS’s twenty-two component agencies. A few participants said the 
department had become so dysfunctional, and so destructive to agency functions, 
that it should be dismantled. Many others argued that breaking up DHS would 
create so much “organizational churn” that homeland security operations would be 
damaged for years to come. Nevertheless, participants agreed that within the 
existing department framework, significant opportunities exist to strengthen unity of 
effort.  
• Re-establish an Integrated Staff Organization. A number of 
participants criticized current DHS leadership for dismantling the operational 
integration staff (I-Staff) that Secretary Ridge established in December of 
2003. Ridge created a formally structured I-Staff to help him provide unified 
strategic direction to DHS’ twenty-two component agencies, and help break 
down the organizational divides that would otherwise persist between them. 
Rather than have each agency report in a “stovepiped” fashion to the 
secretary, with each developing its own budgetary and programmatic 
proposals in isolation, the I-Staff was supposed to integrate such efforts to 
meet overall department priorities by providing centralized guidance on 
strategic priorities, planning, doctrinal development, and training. No 
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equivalent staff structure exists today, and participants argued that 
stovepiping flourishes as a result.   
A few participants warned that too much integration would be a bad thing, 
however. The integrated staff should give DHS agencies guidance on the 
outcomes to be achieved; agencies should be left with considerable latitude to 
decide how best to accomplish those goals.  
Other participants noted that Congress had gone along with the 
dismantling of Ridge’s integrated staff, and would be likely to resist future 
efforts at integration. Committee oversight of DHS is extraordinarily 
fragmented; the committees that have retained jurisdiction over component 
agencies have a vested interest in preserving the autonomy of those agencies.  
Agency leaders, in turn, have “gone around” DHS leaders to advance their 
own objectives, including helping scuttle progress towards the I-Staff and 
DHS regional office structure that Ridge envisioned. 
• Build a much stronger policy staff. Participants argued that from the 
inception of DHS, the department’s policy planning staff has been 
extraordinarily weak, especially in comparison with departments such as 
DOD. Participants argued that the changes made under DHS’ Second Stage 
Review did little to alter this situation. One consequence for unity of effort is 
that, while there has been what one participant called a “bloatation” of 
strategies by the Homeland Security Council, little doctrine has been built to 
guide and coordinate federal, state, local, and private sector operations. A 
number of participants argued that this lack of doctrine is an especially 
significant shortfall in homeland security to date, and that the next 
administration will need to focus on doctrinal development. To make that 
possible, however, the administration will have to strengthen the doctrine 
development and planning capabilities of DHS. At least as important, the 
administration will also need to help build the planning capabilities of DHS 
partners (local, state, and non-DOD federal) and integrate the department’s 
partners into the planning process in a way that goes far beyond the current 
system. 
• Leverage the non-security functions of DHS agencies more 
effectively. Some participants argued that the current administration has 
erred in attempting to build homeland security capacity by creating terrorism-
specific plans and capabilities from scratch. A more leveraged approach would 
be to take advantage of the non-security expertise of DHS agencies in 
regulatory, safety, and other realms, and apply that expertise to homeland 
security requirements. The opportunities to utilize the Coast Guard in this 
fashion are especially notable, but possibilities exist in other agencies as well.  
A strategy of this kind will help bridge the divide between security and non-
security missions in DHS and provide for better unity of effort across the 




STOCKTON AND ROBERTS, CISAC FORUM REPORT 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 2 (JUNE 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
5 
III. JOINTNESS IN THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: LESSONS 
LEARNED FOR HOMELAND SECURITY 
Forum participants noted that the non-hierarchical political environment that 
characterizes homeland security creates problems for unity of effort entirely different 
from those within DOD. In particular, participants agreed that lessons learned from 
DOD efforts to build “jointness” across service lines would have limited applicably to 
homeland security, since many key organizations in the latter realm report to 
governors and mayors rather than to the president.   
Discussions focused on the problems that the Department of Defense faces in 
contributing to homeland security and partnering with other federal agencies and 
states and localities. Two issues were of special concern to participants: 
• Rethink the split between homeland defense and homeland 
security. A number of participants criticized the Bush Administration for 
building a distinction between homeland defense and homeland security, and 
argued that the resulting split is guaranteed to impede unity of effort between 
DOD (responsible for the former) and DHS (responsible for the latter). One 
participant argued that homeland defense versus homeland security is “a 
distinction without a difference,” and that the next administration should 
eliminate the term homeland defense.  
• Heighten the priority of civil support relative to homeland 
defense. NORTHCOM has tended to treat homeland defense as its top 
priority and civil support as a secondary focus for resourcing and policy 
development. Participants argued that those priorities ought to be reversed, 
and that doing so will facilitate closer integration between the command and 
the federal, state and local entities with which it needs to partner for disaster 
response support operations.  
IV. STATES AND LOCALITIES 
In the summer of 2007, a breakdown was underway in the relationship between 
DHS and states and localities. That breakdown was most evident in the evolution of 
the draft National Response Framework (NRF), which DHS was drafting to replace 
the National Response Plan. Forum participants noted that, in early 2007, DHS 
made a concerted effort to involve state and local representative in the drafting 
process. After providing their input, those representatives were shocked when DHS 
issued a draft report in August 2007 excluding a number of their most important 
recommendations. DHS took those concerns into account in drafting the final NRF 
of January 2008. For the state and local participants in the forum, however, the NRF 
process exemplified the underlying fragility and weakness of their collaborative 
relationship with DHS. 
One participant argued that over the past three years, there has been a “steady 
deterioration” in the links between DHS and its state and local counterpart 
organizations. Another participant said that “DHS has squandered years of goodwill 
with states and localities,” because the department has been “locking them out of 
decision-making. Now, we just look at DHS as a federal teat.” Other participants 
maintained that “the department just pays lip service” to the importance of state and 
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local input on policy issues. The failure of DHS to accept input on the 2007 draft 
National Response Framework was cited as a case in point. As one participant 
summarized the situation (with perhaps a bit of hyperbole), “There is no relationship 
between the federal government and states and localities.”  
Participants from the federal government argued that any administration would 
have faced difficulties in achieving the collaborative goals that states and localities 
seek. The sheer number of states and local jurisdictions, and the diversity of 
positions they represent, complicate federal efforts to incorporate their views in 
planning and programming. As one federal participant noted, “It is intrinsically 
difficult to coordinate with a hundred national associations, each state and territory, 
as well as major urban area and other jurisdictions, no matter who is in charge of 
DHS.” 
State and local participants are especially unhappy with the flow of intelligence 
from DHS. The department has become “irrelevant” to states and localities as a 
source of intelligence, because that intelligence lacks timeliness and adds so little 
value to local terrorism prevention efforts. Another participant noted that “the 
stream of intelligence from DHS is useless,” and that FBI-led Joint Terrorism Task 
Forces remained too focused on criminal activity and investigations (versus the 
intelligence gathering and analysis that is critical to terrorism prevention). As a 
result, localities were building their own intelligence systems to compensate for the 
inadequacies of federal intelligence support. 
Proposals to improve unity of effort between federal, state, and local governments 
fell into two categories: changes within DHS and changes at the state and local level 
to lessen their dependence on DHS (and counter the department’s status as “the 
800-pound gorilla,” as one participant characterized it).   
• Drastically alter the criteria for selecting DHS leaders. Participants 
agreed that the next administration should appoint far more senior officials to 
DHS “who are fluent in state and local government” and who are predisposed 
to accept state and local input on policy issues.  
• Re-establish the DHS Office of State and Local Government 
Coordination and Preparedness (OSLGCP). The next administration 
should also make structural changes to reverse the collapse of relations 
between DHS and its state and local partners. A number of participants 
argued that under Governor Ridge, OSLGCP had provided a relatively 
effective means by which states and localities could provide input to senior 
DHS leaders.  Chertoff subsumed that office under DHS’ Grants and Training 
organization, and (according to one participant) “systematically dismantled” 
the coordination activities that the office had previously provided.  An Office 
of State and Local Government Coordination should be reestablished with a 
direct reporting relationship to the secretary of DHS. Reconstituting that 
office, however, would not obviate the need for DHS components to build 
their own collaborative relationships with appropriate state and local 
representatives.  
• Improve the way that states and localities select their 
representatives to provide input. One participant noted that, at present, 
“DHS tries to ‘cherry-pick’ governors, mayors, and emergency managers to 
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say, ‘We agree with what you’re proposing.’” The associations that represent 
states, localities, and other non-federal partners in homeland security need to 
organize themselves to counter such tactics. Federal participants had a 
different reason to support such reorganization: that is, to have states and 
localities attempt to reach consensus at their level, rather than present DHS 
with myriad conflicting positions on homeland security issues.  
• Restructure DHS grants to states and localities. A number of 
participants thought that the current DHS grant system fosters competition 
between localities and is destructive to building unity of effort across 
jurisdictional lines. The grant process should be restructured to facilitate 
regional cooperation, not undermine it. Consensus emerged that grants 
should also place more of an emphasis on building state and local planning 
capacity, rather than emphasizing equipment purchases. Participants also 
expressed support for federal funding of state and local staff positions to 
provide regional cooperation, and for funding to strengthen the Emergency 
Management Assistance Compact (EMAC) system. The latter effort could be 
especially helpful in reducing state and local dependence on the federal 
government in all but the most devastating disasters. Some participants did 
worry that, taken to an extreme, federal support for state and local staffing 
would conflict with the need for states and localities to be responsible for their 
own homeland security operations.   
• Refine risk-based strategies for grant funding. One participant noted 
that in DHS, “I don’t think we do much risk management with grants – we do 
vulnerability management. Awarding a grant isn’t going to lessen the risk of 
an attack or hurricane, but it is going to reduce our vulnerability to those 
threats. We need a more sophisticated appraisal of what we are doing, why we 
are doing it, and what effect we want to accomplish.” Participants debated a 
number of risk-based strategies that the next administration might use to 
guide the allocation of federal preparedness grants. One approach focuses on 
defending against the most catastrophic threats, which include smallpox, 
anthrax, botulinum toxin, nuclear radiation, and pandemic flu. Another 
strategy funds a minimal level of preparedness across the United States and 
allocates funding beyond that level to specific jurisdictions on the basis of risk 
and the mix of potential targets within the jurisdiction. Many participants 
agreed that national response and recovery is best ensured when all regions 
have attained at least a minimum capacity, because areas not affected by a 
disaster can provide a “surge capacity” for other areas in times of disaster.   
Other participants argued that the next administration should rethink the 
core objectives for using grant assistance to build unity of effort. “The need for 
unity in homeland security is now qualitatively different from in the past.  Our 
past conceptions of unity have flowed from our preoccupation with, and deep 
experience in, incident management. We need to move beyond that 
preoccupation. We also need to think more in grant assistance about the 
problem of sustaining capabilities, rather than just building them, and begin 
to ask the question: how much is enough?”  
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V. THE PRIVATE SECTOR 
The discussion of building unity of effort between government and the private sector 
was notable in three respects.  Participants offered new insights into the problems of 
government regulation in the homeland security realm. Participants also shared 
lessons learned from ongoing regulatory initiatives and discussed ways in which 
industry is taking the lead to build collaboration. Most important, the discussion 
raised a number of opportunities for the next administration to apply these lessons 
across a broad range of homeland security challenges.   
The private sector is critical to unity of effort in homeland security, of course, 
because private industry owns so much of U.S. critical infrastructure and possesses 
data critical to terrorism prevention. The potential for conflict between government 
and industry is equally clear: that is, between the public good of homeland security 
and private economic goals. In particular, participants noted industry concerns that 
government-mandated protective measures can make them less competitive in the 
global economy, and that liability issues can pose serious risks unless taken into 
account in regulatory design or statutory protection. Participants also noted that 
there is often an investment gap between what businesses think is cost-effective to 
spend on protection and prevention, and what government officials believe is 
necessary to secure privately-held infrastructure from terrorist attack or exploitation 
as a means to deliver weapons. Some participants argued that the electric power grid 
offers a prime example of where industry has invested far too little in building 
system resilience. Other participants disagreed, highlighting how difficult it will be to 
reach consensus on the appropriate level of security-oriented investment in 
particular infrastructure sectors, and on the need for government to either require 
greater investment by the private sector or use government funds to underwrite such 
efforts.  
Protective measures can occasionally help an industry’s bottom line. For example, 
the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) persuaded airlines that installing 
security cameras in baggage handling areas would pay for itself by reducing theft.  
Private economic interests can also reinforce private sector incentives to strengthen 
homeland security. One participant noted that the Boeing Company had strong 
incentives to perform effectively in executing its baggage screening contract for TSA 
because if that screening system broke down, “Boeing’s industry customers would rip 
it apart.” Private sector efforts to ensure continuation of operations (COOP) provide 
another realm in which industry incentives will often coincide with homeland 
security goals.  In other cases, however, Congress and/or DHS will push to impose 
regulations on industry that are more costly, or more disruptive to business 
practices, than the industry would prefer.   
Participants discussed three strategies to help secure industry from attack, which 
might be considered “layers in a cake.” The first layer is that of encouraging the 
private sector to do more to secure itself. One critical goal here is “getting the outliers 
in an industry to get in line,” in part by having industries exert peer pressure on the 
companies that are laggards. The second layer consists of helping states and 
localities partner with industry. Until recently, virtually no planning had been done 
between industry and local public safety agencies to prepare for protection and 
prevention activities (and in many cases, not enough for response operations as 
STOCKTON AND ROBERTS, CISAC FORUM REPORT 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 2 (JUNE 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
9 
well).  DHS and its state and local partners were also “starting from scratch” in 
designing grant programs that would build collaborative relationships between those 
partners and the industries in their midst. Ongoing progress in those efforts needs to 
be continued in the next administration. 
The third layer is most problematic: that is, imposing regulations on industry.  
One participant noted that the most serious problems for DHS in the regulatory 
realm lie with those industries that have a long history of being regulated. For those 
industries, “regulation is a bad word,” and they have carried over to DHS the 
adversarial relationship they had with their previous regulators. Especially in the 
safety realm, the attitude of “us versus them” is deeply ingrained. If that attitude is 
transferred to the homeland security realm, “we are doomed.” Many (though not all) 
participants agreed that the next administration should adopt the following 
guidelines to assist regulatory design: 
• Avoid “one size fits all” approaches to regulation. A participant 
noted that “while it’s hard for the Feds to deal with the diversity of states and 
localities, it’s even tighter to deal with the diversity of the private sector.” The 
history of the Transportation Worker Identification Credential (TWIC) 
program exemplifies the failure of the early DHS approach to industry 
regulation, in which officials adopted a “one size fits all” approach. The 
history of regulatory efforts in food safety and environmental controls also 
reveals that broad, sector-wide industry regulations will often create 
unnecessary problems for compliance by specific companies and facilities.  
Sector-wide regulations also frequently prompt industry to litigate or lobby 
Congress to kill the rules in question. Regulations should be narrowly targeted 
to take into account variations in industry characteristics while still providing 
for the prevention and protection objectives that government seeks. This 
targeted approach will require that government rely on industry to provide 
information on vulnerabilities and protective opportunities as regulations are 
drafted. The history of U.S. regulatory efforts also suggests that, in developing 
targeted regulations, industry should be asked to provide such information 
early in the drafting process rather than at the back end when key decisions 
have already been made. Environmental and occupational safety regulations 
have become increasingly data-driven; the next administration needs to build 
on the progress DHS has made in applying a similar data-driven approach to 
critical infrastructure protection.  
• Innovative analysis and data collection mechanisms must be 
developed to assess regulatory costs and benefits. A particularly 
important realm for incorporating data into regulatory design lies in 
measuring the benefits and costs of homeland security regulations.  On the 
benefits side of the equation, the uncertainty of whether a terrorist attack on a 
facility will occur – and succeed – complicates the problem of assessing what 
a given regulation will accomplish. That benefits calculus should also be 
extended to take into account the value of protective measures for guarding 
against industrial accidents or natural hazards. It is on the cost side of the 
ledger, however, where the greatest opportunities for progress exit.   
STOCKTON AND ROBERTS, CISAC FORUM REPORT 
 
 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 2 (JUNE 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG  
 
10 
The interaction between the aviation industry and TSA exemplifies these 
opportunities. In the aftermath of 9/11, industry leaders were concerned that 
government regulations to harden the industry from further attack would kill 
it outright. To head off that risk, industry provided TSA with a cost model of 
the industry that was far more detailed than the government had ever 
possessed. Yet, unless those cost models also included sensitive proprietary 
information on profitability and costs, they would remain inadequate as a 
guide for regulatory efforts. Industry leaders worried that the federal 
government would leak that information. In response, industry partnered 
with TSA to create the U.S. Commercial Aviation partnership, which 
aggregates sensitive proprietary information in a way that protects the 
companies that provide it while still offering a sound basis for regulatory 
design. The next administration should consider applying this partnership 
model to other sectors where inadequate cost modeling continues to impede 
regulatory design.    
• Build on the Sector Partnership model. In implementing the National 
Infrastructure Prevention Plan, DHS has made significant progress in 
institutionalizing a collaborative process by which industry and state and local 
perspectives are brought to bear on regulatory issues. A number of 
participants suggested that the next administration should apply the Sector 
Partnership model to other realms of homeland security. In particular, 
participants noted that rather than bringing stakeholders into the regulatory 
development process at the back end, when DHS officials had already made 
key decisions, the sector partnership model brought industry into the process 
early on so that consensus-building could proceed from the outset. DHS ought 
to follow a similar approach to get state and local buy-in for homeland 
security priorities and programmatic objectives beyond critical infrastructure 
protection. 
The General Accountability Office (GAO) has recently reached the same 
conclusion. On November 1, 2007, the GAO suggested to Congress that 
federal agencies make better use of DHS’ critical infrastructure coordinating 
councils to strengthen preparedness for pandemic flu.1 The GAO found that 
such councils have shown great promise in bringing together multiple 
stakeholders from all levels of government and the private sector to build 
consensus on objectives and functional responsibilities. Further research is 
needed to explore how the lessons learned from infrastructure councils might 
be applied more broadly and – in particular – whether this approach might 
help bridge the widening gaps between DHS and states and localities in 
setting homeland security goals. 
• Consider vulnerability reduction by reducing industry 
concentration. Some participants argued that the private sector has 
economic incentives to concentrate facilities and infrastructure sector 
components that, for the sake of security, should be dispersed. Concentration 
has long been a public safety problem in the chemical industry. In addition, 
however, concentration is accelerating across a range of other infrastructure 
sectors, including agriculture, telecommunications, electric power, and 
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banking. Reducing industry concentration will be costly in many of these 
sectors, as would physically separating vulnerable facilities and transportation 
links from population centers. Yet the security benefits of doing so would be 
immense, and may be difficult to achieve through less radical solutions.   
VI. ADDITIONAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
A number of participants argued that the next administration should focus on the 
risk that civil society is becoming disaffected from homeland security. One 
participant argued that the public is becoming increasingly skeptical of the value of 
and need for homeland security programs. Others argued that despite programs such 
as Ready.Gov., the current administration has not effectively engaged the public in 
becoming a partner in homeland security, and in taking responsibility for 
preparedness within their own homes.  
Participants agreed that the fragmented structure of congressional oversight of 
homeland security contributed to the difficulty of achieving unity of effort, especially 
in interagency relations across the federal government. Little progress seems likely 
to occur towards centralization of oversight, however, due to the ability of 
committees to protect their oversight “turf” from proposals for change. Change 
might be more practical in the Homeland Security Council (HSC). A number of 
participants argued that it was destructive to unity of effort to have a separate HSC, 
and that a Council should be combined with the National Security Council to form a 
single, integrated advisory body. Other participants argued that homeland security 
issues would inevitably be given short shrift in any such unified arrangement.  
Participants agreed, however, that the Homeland Security Council needed to avoid 
involvement in operational issues and should focus on the sort of policy coordination 
functions equivalent to those performed by the Council of Economic Advisers. 
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This is a hierarchy. As the report of the 9/11 commission makes clear, even 
though the structure of al Qaeda before the 9/11 attacks was not rigid, and lines of 
command and control not always simple and clear, not all the nodes in al Qaeda 
were equal in authority.2 Some individuals in the organization had more 
authority than others and were “higher,” so to speak, in the organizational chart 
than others. 
Was al Qaeda a network or a hierarchy? Is it now a leaderless jihad?3 Actually, 
these questions do not matter. The most important issue for an organization or 
those fighting it is not what structure it has. The most important issue is how well 
an organization’s structure is adapted to its environment, which includes what its 
enemies are doing, given what the organization wants to achieve and the 
resources available to it. No one organizational structure is always inherently 
superior to another. Some are better for some things, some for others. These 
principles apply to al Qaeda as well as the governmental network (the federal, 
state, and local governments) in the United States. Hence, if we examine two 
contending organizations in their environments, we may be able to discern 
optimal strategies for these organizations. With regard to the United States, the 
optimal strategy turns out to be the opposite of what is or has been commonly 
recommended. Once we understand the relative strengths and weaknesses of 
networks and hierarchies, particularly the foreign and domestic militant Islamic 
networks that we confront, we see that it does not take a network to fight a 
terrorist network and that it is not very helpful to emphasize the killing and 
capturing of high-value terrorist targets. Instead, we see that we should 
deemphasize the direct fight against these networks and put more emphasis on 
countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. 
To see this in detail, we will consider first some basic differences among 
organizations and the strengths and weaknesses of two different organizational 
forms (networks and hierarchies); then apply this organizational analysis to 
terrorist organizations and the governmental network in the United States; and, 
finally, suggest optimal strategies for countering the terrorist threats we face.  
The initial discussion of organizational forms will be somewhat simplified (e.g., it 
assumes a clear distinction between networks and hierarchies that is ultimately 
untenable) in order to emphasize certain organizational characteristics or 
tendencies. 
DIFFERENCES AMONG ORGANIZATIONS 
One way to understand the differences among organizations is to focus on two 
key variables: frequency of personal contact and the location of authority. In a 
market, individuals deal with each other once or infrequently and authority has 
no location. The price mechanism structures the market, not any authority 
separate from the price mechanism. Individuals can have recurring contact in a 
market but in that case what tends to develop is a network. A contractor might 
conclude that it is more efficient to deal with one or two carpenters, for example.  
Both the contractor and the carpenters benefit from this arrangement. Price is 
still important but a personal connection and some degree of trust also keeps the 
network together. The contractor has ultimate responsibility for how the work is 
done, and to discharge that responsibility will tell the carpenters what needs to be 
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done, but he trusts them and cedes some authority to them to get the work done 
right and even to suggest better ways to do it based on their expertise. All 
participants in this construction network share some authority and control over 
their relationships. If for some reason the general contractor thinks he needs 
more authority over the carpenters and other skilled personnel he needs to 
complete his projects (when the number or the complexity of the projects 
increases, for example), he might hire them permanently. A company would then 
have formed. The general contractor would become the boss and the others 
would work for him. The boss’ contact with his employees would be recurring but 
authority would more clearly reside in him. Trust might well diminish, especially 
if the company is large, because the boss will not know the individuals who are 
actually doing the work as well as the contractor in the network example did. The 
network would have become a hierarchy.4 
What distinguishes both a network and a hierarchy from a market is that in the 
network contact among the members is recurring. What distinguishes a network 
from a hierarchy is that in the latter the recurring contacts take place within a 
framework of legitimate or accepted authority. In a hierarchy, information flows 
up from the bottom and decisions and information flow down from the top. Rank 
and authority go together; the higher one’s rank in the organization, the more 
authority one has. Forms of authority other than those derived from rank exist in 
a hierarchy, such as authority based on technical expertise, but rank can and may 
trump these other kinds of authority; in a hierarchy, rank confers ultimate 
authority. Rules and regulations express that authority. Those lower in the 
hierarchy have less say in making the rules and regulations, but are bound by 
them and therefore have less autonomy and less room to exercise initiative than 
those above them. The lower in the hierarchy one is, the more restricted and 
specialized is one’s task, typically. This division of labor, supervised at each level, 
and denial of initiative means that trust is not very important in a hierarchical 
organization. Each level knows what those below are supposed to do (this is often 
specified in writing) and works to see that it gets done. No one relies on trust 
alone to see that those below them in the hierarchy do their jobs. 
The hierarchical structure presented (perhaps caricatured) here offers 
advantages and disadvantages.5 It is a good way to organize a mass of poorly 
educated workers, for example. They do not have the knowledge or the skills to be 
trusted to operate efficiently or effectively on their own, so they need to learn to 
do simple tasks and be carefully supervised to see that they do them. In this 
setting, there is accountability. The boss at the top can find out what each of his 
workers or production lines has produced and, if it is not producing enough, 
knows exactly whom to blame. Such a structure allows for fast and efficient 
implementation of decisions, once they are made at the top.  The boss and every 
supervisor below the boss have the authority to impose change on every member 
of the organization. In the context of the U.S. government, a hierarchical military 
structure was a good way to organize a mass of poorly educated soldiers into an 
effective fighting force. Especially within its tradition of attrition warfare, in 
which it sought to apply uniformly the greatest possible degree of firepower to 
overwhelm its opponents,6 the U.S. military found a highly developed 
hierarchical structure congenial. In the bureaucracy, the accountability of 
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hierarchy is also a great boon for those who care about the rule of law. Those who 
represent us in the legislature and wield our power and implement it through the 
bureaucracy can in principle find out exactly who made which decisions and who 
wrote which memos. 
Balancing the advantages of the hierarchy are certain disadvantages. It may be 
that implementation of decisions can happen quickly in a bureaucracy once the 
decisions are made but it is also true that the information needed to make those 
decisions may flow to the decision makers slowly because it must go through so 
many levels. Not only do the levels slow information transfer and, ultimately, 
decision making, but they may well distort it. Even inadvertently, as information 
passes through many hands, it changes, much as the message that begins the 
children’s game of “telephone” emerges garbled at the end of the line of children 
who have transmitted it. But there may also be malicious distortion.  Each level in 
a bureaucracy may have its own interests. Refracted through those interests as it 
moves along, information may arrive at the top both too slowly and as a distorted 
image. 
Whether the various advantages and disadvantages of hierarchies predominate 
depends on the environment in which the hierarchies must survive. As suggested 
above, in the nineteenth and early twentieth-centuries, hierarchically organized 
factories and armies may well have been the best way to take advantage of masses 
of relatively uneducated workers and conscripts. As the education and 
capabilities of workers and conscripts or volunteers improve, that may no longer 
be the case, at least to the same degree. The relative advantages and 
disadvantages of organizational forms is not just a question of the time in which 
they operate, however. For example, firms that operate internationally may profit 
from a different form of organization. In this case, a head office could not know 
what would work best in a variety of different countries around the world, so it 
would make sense to send its authority down and out to branches operating 
overseas. This flattening of authority was made possible by improved 
communication and information technology that lowered the cost of doing 
business even over vast distances. This flattening also gives more autonomy to 
lower levels and thus requires that a certain amount of trust move down and out 
as well.  
Compared to the strict hierarchical model, the flattened structure described 
above should see an increase in the speed with which information moves to the 
decision-making level (because the decision-making level has moved lower) and 
less distortion of information (because it travels through fewer levels to reach 
decision makers and, in this case, fewer cultural filters). The result should be 
faster and more accurately informed decision making. In the context of the U.S. 
military, one might think of the regional commands as an example of this 
flattened hierarchy. Within at least one of these commands this flattening has led 
to experiments with additional flattening.7 Certain disadvantages balance the 
advantages of the flattened structure, however. First, faster, better-informed 
decision making may not necessarily be better decision making. Faster decision 
making may mean in some cases that bad decisions are made faster. 
Furthermore, the original or central hierarchy loses some control over the 
components to which it has distributed authority. The loss of control means that 
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there may also be an increase in the difficulty of implementing any decisions that 
the center arrives at. For example, the Pentagon gave the Special Operations 
Command authority over the global war on terrorism but the regional commands 
resisted.8 Finally, from the viewpoint of the center, there will be less 
accountability or a decreased ability to identify who exactly is responsible for 
which decisions. All of this is the consequence of delegating authority down and 
out from a central hierarchy.   
If the workers involved in an activity are well-educated and what they must do 
cannot be reduced to simplified tasks performed repetitively but requires 
initiative and creativity, then a further flattening may be necessary to gain the full 
value of their work. Ultimately, the flattening may continue until it reaches what 
was described above as a network, a set of recurring interactions without any 
legitimate or accepted central authority controlling or directing them. The 
members of such an organization might be linked by nothing more than a 
common purpose and, implicitly at least, a good deal of trust that each is serving 
that common purpose. As noted, such an organization would be well suited to 
take advantage of highly skilled, motivated members. In such an organization, 
given the absence of layers between actors, information should flow as freely as it 
can and with as little distortion as possible. This should make the network highly 
responsive and adaptive to its surroundings. It should also be resilient, since if 
one node runs into trouble, others can carry on. An example of such a network 
would be the International Campaign to Ban Landmines, which started with six 
non-governmental organizations united by the common purpose of banning land 
mines and grew to include numerous organizations sharing that purpose. With 
no central authority dictating how members of the coalition should act, the 
Campaign managed within five years to get a treaty banning land mines signed by 
122 nations,9 out-maneuvering the traditional hierarchical bureaucracies that 
opposed it. 
The network form does have disadvantages, however. It has no formal control 
over its members, although peer pressure might operate. The trust it relies on 
might well be misplaced. If the activity one is involved in requires centralized 
control, managing military fire support, for example,10 or the flow of resources to 
a disaster area, then decentralized authority is not best. In networks, there is also 
less accountability. This is not to say that in hierarchies there is always 
accountability. But the failures in accountability that we see in hierarchies are 
precisely that, failures.  Accountability is inherent in a hierarchy and when it does 
not occur, whether negligently or intentionally, it is a failure. A network is 
defined in a sense as an organization in which no one has the authority to hold 
someone else accountable. Individuals or nodes in a network may in fact hold 
someone accountable (“I won’t get that jerk to do my wiring again,” says the 
disgruntled contractor) but that is a personal not an organizational decision. Over 
time in a network, the individual decisions of practitioners when communicated 
among members may begin to coalesce into an accepted set of standards of 
conduct, supported by peer pressure. The next step is that the network or 
community establishes mechanisms to enforce these standards. At this point, 
there is organizational accountability and some form of hierarchical relationship 
among the members of the organization or community.  
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We may summarize the different advantages and disadvantages of hierarchies 
and networks as follows. Hierarchies, or more exactly organizations with 
centralized control, provide accountability and can enforce standards. They also 
can implement decisions more quickly and efficiently than networks, or 
organizations without centralized control, but they may make those decisions 
more slowly than the speed at which their environment is changing, since 
information must travel through many layers to get to decision makers. In 
addition, the information may be distorted when it arrives. This means 
organizations with centralized authority may not be as responsive and adaptable 
as they need to be given the changes occurring in their environment. This means 
in turn that they face the long-term risk of extinction. Also, a centralized 
organization may not be very resilient. If the center suffers catastrophic failure, 
the whole organization is at risk. Networks, on the other hand, respond more 
quickly to their environments because every node is in effect a sensor and a 
decider. Information does not have to go anywhere to be effective. It is also the 
case that as information from all the sensor-decider nodes travels through the 
network, the members in effect get to sample various ways of adapting to the 
environment, which increases the adaptability of the network over time. As nodes 
communicate, they get to see what works and what does not, which allows the 
nodes and ultimately the network to deal with mistakes and distorted 
information in a way that is more efficient and effective than the way that a 
hierarchy does. Decentralized organizations are also more resilient. If one node 
fails, the whole network does not fail. But the lack of centralized control over 
members of the network means that what the network does in toto (the sum of 
the actions of the individual nodes) is unpredictable. This generates the risk that 
in the short-term individual nodes will do something that adversely affects the 
whole network. This means that network organizations suffer from short-term 
risks, even as their adaptability lowers their long-term risk. Finally, networks 
make accountability more difficult, since authority is diffuse and control limited 
or non-existent. 
In addition to noting that different kinds of organizations offer different 
advantages and disadvantages and are more or less suited to different kinds of 
tasks in different kinds of environments, we should note that the stark categories 
of “centralized” or “decentralized” are too rigid for what we encounter in the 
world. Organizations are some blend of centralization and decentralization.  
Hierarchies have networks in them, either formal (e.g., interagency coordinating 
groups) or informal (e.g., those who served on the president’s or governor’s 
campaign). And most networks contain at least informal authority hierarchies.  
In the campaign to ban landmines, the original NGOs and a few individuals 
(either because of their experience or personal characteristics) had more 
authority as a matter of fact than other NGOs or individuals. One analysis of 
decentralized organizations offers Hezbollah as an example of such 
organizations, saying of it that “although the formal structure is highly 
bureaucratic, interactions among the members are volatile and do not follow 
rigid lines of control.”11 This remark shows the blend of centralism and 
decentralism that exists in organizations.  Since the remark could equally apply to 
the U.S. federal bureaucracy, it also reminds us that structures that are reputed to 
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be quite different (a hierarchical bureaucracy and a networked terrorist 
organization) may in fact not be completely dissimilar, a point to which we will 
return. All of this supports the contention that the important issue is not whether 
an organization is a hierarchy or centralized, or a network or decentralized, but 
how well its structure is adapted to the activities the organization carries out and 
the environment in which it carries them out. 
TERRORISM AND NETWORKS 
How do these distinctions among organizations apply to terrorists? To see how 
they do, we should start with an account of how someone becomes a terrorist that 
ignores the organizational distinctions. This account puts the emphasis on an 
individual:  if one has a grievance, one must decide what to do about it. If the 
costs of correcting the problem are greater than the costs imposed by the 
problem, then one might decide to do nothing.  In a totalitarian state, this is the 
common calculation. But if it appears that something can be done at a cost that is 
less than the cost imposed by the problem, then one must decide what to do. 
Perhaps the most important choice is whether to seek redress through peaceful or 
violent means. The peaceful path leads to some sort of overt activity, 
participation in a political party or a demonstration perhaps. One might be 
arrested at the demonstration or simply go home after it.  In either case, one is 
back where one started. One might well continue on this peaceful path – a 
repeating cycle of protest, arrest, and release, for example – especially if it 
seemed to be doing some good. But one might also decide that peaceful protest is 
insufficient.  The alternative – violent resistance – obviously has higher costs, not 
just arrest but perhaps imprisonment or even death. Given that the possibility of 
successfully redressing grievances through violence is so remote (in the 
beginning, those using violence are few and weak, their opponents many and 
strong), why would anyone choose this path? 
The overwhelming evidence is that the choice for violence or the life of a 
terrorist is not made typically in the individualistic way in which we have just 
presented it. The choice occurs in the context or with the help of networks of 
relationships. For example, the anti-war movement in the United States in the 
1960s and 1970s was a network of individuals and organizations, the vast 
majority of which believed in working peacefully within the system, as the saying 
was then. A small number of those involved in the anti-war movement separated 
themselves into the Students for a Democratic Society, which had a more militant 
approach. From this group there eventually emerged the violent clandestine 
group known as the Weathermen. A similar movement can be seen from animal 
rights supporters, to an organization like People for the Ethical Treatment of 
Animals (PETA), and on to the violent Animal Liberation Front. Another example 
would be the movement of Ayman al-Zawahiri, typically described as al Qaeda’s 
number two, from the umma, or Islamic community of Egypt, through the 
Mulsim Brotherhood, to Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist organization, and on 
to al Qaeda.    
The same process is evident in groups like those that carried out the 9/11 and 
London attacks or have plotted to carry out similar attacks in the United States. 
Typically, there is a group of people who are already friends, or friends of friends, 
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who share an interest in Islam. They discuss their evolving beliefs and encourage 
each other. At some point, they might come into contact with an authoritative 
teacher, who furthers their movement toward militant Islam. Also, one individual 
within the group might emerge as its leader, as the one most interested in taking 
action. He might, with or without the assistance of the spiritual advisor, arrange 
to travel to Afghanistan or Pakistan for some training. As their religious thought 
becomes more radical and their plans mature, the group may take on the vague 
shape of an organization, with some members being responsible for raising 
money, while others, perhaps with background information acquired in 
university chemistry courses, develop skills at bomb making, all under the 
guidance of the operational and spiritual leaders.     










The groups that carry out the attack arise within the world of expatriate Islam, 
which forms a ghetto in a cultural, if not a geographic sense, drawing in converts, 
who sometimes turn out to be the most committed to the militant cause. Not only 
does the small group encourage each of its members in the process of 
radicalization, but the small group draws support from the networks of religious 
groups and brotherhoods that operate within the Islamic world. Finally, as the 
group comes closer and closer to a willingness to use violence, it may find 
operational support in the network of militants that can transport people from 
Europe to South Asia and back again.12 
In the cases we have just briefly considered, networks of relationships aided 
the mobilization and recruitment process. The array of pre-existing social 
networks involved in this process include family (or kin and tribe), ethnic group, 
religious organization, occupation, education and residence.13 These threads, 
knitted together through daily life, create a dense fabric that at each step supports 
the mobilization process. With regard to small groups, by and large there are two 
types of explanations for how this support works, one psychological, the other 
sociological. Psychologists have documented what they call group extremity shift 
or the tendency of a group of people to move toward a more extreme expression 
of the group’s dominant view. Typically, no one in a group wants to be left behind 
or left out. Even reluctantly, people tend to move with the group.  If the group is 
clandestine and at danger from the authorities, appearing to be the laggard might 
even suggest disloyalty. Thus members of a group, particularly members of a 
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clandestine group, have an incentive not to lag behind and even to prove 
themselves the most fervent members of the group.14 A sociologist examining 
how networks support social movements has identified three ways in which they 
do this. First, networks perform a socialization function, helping members sort 
out who they are as they interact with the trusted members of the network.  
Second, network connections help create opportunities to participate, from the 
first study group that someone attends, to training in bomb making. Third, 
network relationships affect calculations of costs and benefits.15 What another 
study has called the “social and behavioral dynamics of small groups”16 make the 
decision for terrorism – to benefit the group even at one’s expense – more 
plausible than it might be if one were calculating costs and benefits by oneself 
and only with regard to oneself. Beyond these small groups, which arise out of 
pre-existing social networks, other large transnational networks assist in 
mobilization, if only by providing information through the internet.  
What is true of social movements generally is true even more so of the violent 
clandestine groups that emerge from these movements. Pre-existing social 
networks make possible violent clandestine organizations because these 
organizations cannot recruit openly.17 What is true of social movements and 
violent clandestine groups generally may be even truer of Islamic movements and 
violent clandestine groups. The relationship between social networks, dissidence, 
and violent groups is perhaps more pronounced in Islam than in other traditions. 
Mohamed himself recruited among family and friends and built his movement by 
relying on various pre-existing social networks. According to one scholar of 
Islam, the hostility that greeted Mohamed’s teaching required that his movement 
operate at first as a “secret society.” Pre-existing social networks, particularly his 
clan, allowed him and his followers to survive and their movement to grow. 
Mohamed’s “political acumen and astute leadership” were also necessary, of 
course, but would not have been effective without pre-existing social networks 
within which to work. Ultimately, through his political work and military 
campaigns, Mohamed built a movement that transcended the social networks 
with which he began. Scholars have noted that within the Islamic world of the 
Middle East, the model of the Prophet remains effective. Both those who hold 
political power and those who aspire to it have used and continue to use and 
manipulate a variety of social networks to mobilize people and build their 
movements.18   
One thing that characterizes these movements is an organizational style in 
which “lines of authority and responsibility tend to be fluid and blurred.” The 
leader and his relationships are paramount but authority is not exercised through 
clearly established organizational lines. “Even when institutions such as formal 
bureaucracies have developed, the real business of ruling and political decision 
making has resided in personal networks.”19 In this light, the description of 
Hezbollah given earlier (a bureaucracy without rigid lines of control) does not 
represent the emergence of a new organization form20 but the reliance on a 
centuries-old technique of mobilization.21 We can see even in the emergence of 
the small groups that attacked the United States on 9/11 and the London metro 
system in 2005 a replication of the Prophet’s methods, if not his intention. Non-
violent Islamic groups also use these techniques, of course, (as do groups that are 
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not Islamic) but as noted above, such techniques are particularly useful for 
violent groups that cannot publicize what they are about. As has been the case for 
centuries, the leaders of these groups benefit, for example, from the traditional 
decentralized ways that Muslims give and distribute alms (the zakat).  
Network forms of organization are particularly useful for mobilizing, then.  
Yet, if we consider networks from the perspective of those who recruit or build 
organizations and try to manage violent politics, we can see that these networks 
are problematic. Consider the case of the loosely structured group that carried 
out the attacks on the USS Sullivans (January 2000, which failed), USS Cole 
(October 2000), and the French tanker Limbourg (October 2002). Abd al Rahim 
al Nashiri was the leader of this group. He had the idea of attacking U.S. naval 
vessels and got bin Ladin to support it. He went to Yemen to organize.  A veteran 
of fighting in Afghanistan, Nashiri contacted in Yemen other veterans or people 
with some relationship to bin Ladin. One of these was Waleed Mohammed Bin 
Attash (aka Khallad), an associate of bin Laden who had useful local knowledge 
and contacts. He bought the explosives for the group’s operations locally, for 
example. Also assisting were others with connections to bin Ladin or Attash or 
through them to the Aden Islamic Army. 
The group’s first effort against the USS Sullivans failed when they put too 
much explosive in their boat and it sank. The second effort against the USS Cole 
worked. The third attack also succeeded in that they hit a target, the Limbourg, 
but it was a failure in a larger sense. When it occurred, the attack on the 
Limbourg was thought by analysts to be part of a strategy to attack the West 
economically by attacking its oil supply. In fact, the attack took place not as the 
result of a carefully planned strategy but because members of the group were 
upset that one of their acquaintances had been killed by the government of 
Yemen. The group lashed out at the first target it could find. Because the group 
struck a commercial vessel, insurance rates for the waters near Yemen increased 
substantially. This led to a decrease of traffic into the Yemeni port of Aden, which 
in turn cut the revenues of the Yemeni government. The government responded 
by cracking down on the group.  Members and associates were arrested.22 
The case of the Cole bombers shows the utility of networks for mobilization 
and recruitment. Nashiri’s organizational work was made much easier by the fact 
that he could exploit pre-existing social networks in Yemen. Yet, those networks 
posed problems for Nashiri and bin Laden. Network connections do not cease to 
exist when individuals or nodes in them join a clandestine violent organization.23  
As we have discussed, one characteristic of networks is the freedom of the nodes 
to respond to their environment. While this makes the network adaptive, it also 
can lead to short-term failure, as we noted.  This is illustrated in the case of the 
Cole bombing group. The network connections to an individual outside the group 
led the group to make an ill-considered operational decision that in turn led to 
the compromise not just of those directly involved in the Cole bombing but of 
many members of the larger network from which the bombing group was drawn.  
If an organization has fluid and blurred lines of control and authority, which has 
tended to be true of organizations in the Middle East, then it will be hard for 
leaders to impose strategic direction on the organization. We see another 
example of this in the letter of Ayman al-Zawahiri to the former leader of al 
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Qaeda in Iraq, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. Zawahiri wrote that Zarqawi’s actions 
were discrediting the al Qaeda movement but he had almost no control over 
Zarqawi to correct this problem.24 
Not only will decentralized organizations have trouble with strategy, security is 
likely to be a problem for them as well. Pre-existing social networks are 
important for violent clandestine groups or those who want to start one because 
these groups are at risk.  If an organizer wants to recruit someone, he must think 
about whether the person he approaches will turn him in. To minimize risk, 
organizers turn to those they trust and those they trust are in the social networks 
to which they belong.  What constitutes a trustworthy relationship may vary from 
culture to culture,25 but the need for such relationships in risky clandestine 
activity is universal. Again, however, these relationships do not simply cease to 
exist when the nodes or individuals that form them enter the violent clandestine 
group. If there is no central authority to impose discipline over communication 
and other operational and personal matters, then the pre-existing relationships 
may become, in fact, the bread crumbs that the authorities can follow to identify 
members of the clandestine organization.26  A cell structure can enhance security, 
but only if the cells are compartmented; that is, if the links between the cells or 
nodes are kept to a minimum. To do this requires that discipline or authority 
exist over the cells and those in them. In other words, limited linkages between 
cells or nodes imposed and enforced by a higher or superior authority creates 
better security but it also crates a centralized organization (hierarchy) not a 
decentralized one (network).   
Organizing through networks of trusted individuals also poses another 
problem for clandestine organizations. One way to understand this is through the 
analysis of Mark Granovetter.27 Granovetter used the idea of strong and weak ties 
between people to think about different kinds of social relations and processes.  
He defined a strong tie as “a (probably linear) combination of the amount of time, 
the emotional intensity, the intimacy (mutual confiding) and the reciprocal 
services which characterize the tie.”28 Granovetter argued that the diffusion 
through society of ideas or innovations, for example, would occur more readily 
through weak ties than strong ones because if I talk to someone with whom I 
have only a weak tie, that person is likely to spend more time with other people 
than with me (our weak tie means we do not spend much time together) and 
therefore is more likely to spread an innovation or ideas to someone with whom I 
have not already spoken. The difficulty for those involved in clandestine activities 
is that the risk they operate under tends to lead them to contact or recruit people 
with whom they have strong ties.29  This explains the intuition that clandestine 
groups will have a harder time spreading their ideas through society than groups 
that are not clandestine. Over time, it is even likely that the strong ties that 
members of at-risk clandestine groups rely on are among people already within 
the clandestine world. Thus, members of clandestine organizations have a 
tendency to end up talking amongst themselves and become increasingly 
isolated. As they become isolated and subject to “group think,” they are more 
likely to misjudge their environment and make strategic blunders.30  
We may say, therefore, with regard to violent clandestine organizations, that 
decentralized organizations or networks are best for mobilizing resources and 
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recruiting but that they are worse for security and strategic direction. On the 
other hand, centralized or hierarchical organizations are best for security and 
strategic direction but worse for mobilizing resources and recruiting. To get an 
optimal result, an organizer should try, to the degree possible, to modify his 
organization so that in a given environment it is situated on the centralized-
decentralized continuum in such a way as to maximize the benefits and minimize 
the costs of each kind of organization.  A key consideration will be the level of risk 
to the organization in the operational environment. Generally speaking, the more 
at risk the organization, the more centralized the organization should be.31  The 
organizer’s dilemma, however, remains that security and strategic direction, on 
the one hand, and mobilization of resources on the other are both necessary for 
organizers to succeed but that the former is best done through a centralized 
organization and the latter through a decentralized one.   
STRATEGY 
Strategic implications follow from the requirements of clandestine organizations 
and the structures that best serve these requirements. If we are dealing with a 
movement that has a historic and cultural tendency toward decentralized 
authority, we may surmise from the foregoing analysis that this movement will be 
better at mobilizing and recruiting than at maintaining security and imposing 
strategic direction.32  It is the “network” functions of this movement that are its 
strength and its “hierarchical” functions that are its weakness. If we attack the 
network, we are attacking our opponent’s strength, a dubious strategic choice.  
This is one way to understand why a strategy of killing or capturing high-value 
targets (i.e., key personnel in the movement) is unlikely to be decisive, although it 
may provide tactical advantages in some circumstances. We have managed to kill 
or capture a large number of al Qaeda leaders and drove the organization itself 
out of Afghanistan, but it has reconstituted itself in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas of Pakistan.33 As in any organization, the leadership of a 
decentralized movement is the end product of a mobilization and recruitment 
process. In the case of the Islamic movements that we oppose, this process is 
deeply rooted in social structures and in historical and cultural traditions, 
sanctified by the example of the Prophet. It is powerful and effective.  We are 
unlikely to defeat it by attacking it or its end product directly. Trying to do so 
would be a strategic error. Defeating the mobilization and recruitment process 
directly would require disrupting or destroying the structures and traditions 
through which it thrives. But this would require transforming large portions of at 
least the Middle East. Beginning that transformation was, ultimately, the purpose 
of invading Iraq. 
We would compound this strategic error if we tried to make ourselves more 
networked on the assumption that it takes a network to fight a network.34  In the 
strategic struggle between those who use terrorism and those who oppose them, 
the side that wins is generally the side that best controls and limits its use of 
force.35 This is because terrorism and efforts to counter it are not a war or a battle 
of firepower. The struggle takes place amidst a population and over its opinions, 
rather than between two military forces separated from civilians. Civilian 
populations are sensitive to the violence inflicted on them. Unlike organized 
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military forces, they are not trained or equipped to function in the midst of 
violence. Winning the struggle over the opinions of civilian populations requires, 
then, that violence be controlled and limited. Centralized authority is best for 
controlling and limiting the use of force because centralized authority implies 
control over the nodes in an organization. Shortening the distance between the 
sensor and those who decide what to shoot, so that ultimately sensing and 
deciding to shoot occur in the same node and almost simultaneously, is an 
advantage only when bringing firepower to bear most efficiently is the key to 
success. That is not the key to success in our conflict with the al Qaeda 
movement. Because that movement’s mobilization and recruitment functions are 
so good and we operate under strategic, political, and legal constraints on the use 
of force, control of the use of force and thus separating the sensor and the 
decision to shoot is to our advantage. For the same reason, the other constraints 
under which we operate, such as bureaucratic rules and regulations and respect 
for civil liberties, which have limited the application of the government’s power 
over individuals, are also to our advantage. All of this requires that we fight 
decentralized authority, a network, with centralized authority, a hierarchy.  In 
this sense, it takes a hierarchy to fight a network.36 
A standard objection to reliance on centralized authority against a 
decentralized opponent is that the opponent will make decisions faster than the 
centralized authority and thus adapt more quickly. As we have argued, speed, 
agility, and adaptability are in fact advantages of a decentralized organization.  
Speed in decision making or adaptability is a good thing, however, as we have 
also argued, only if the decisions quickly made are well made. If bad decisions are 
made, making them quickly is not an advantage. There is at least one reason to 
think that centralized organizations may be better at long-term strategic thinking 
than decentralized organizations. A division of labor tends to be a characteristic 
of centralized organizations. This means that centralized organizations are likely 
to have people who specialize in strategic thinking and long-term planning and a 
command and control function that can distribute their thinking throughout the 
organization. Decentralized organizations will tend not to have specialists.  Small 
nodes in particular will probably favor generalists, since they will not have the 
resources to support specialization. Not having people who specialize in strategic 
thinking and long-term planning, networks, we may surmise, will on average not 
be as good at these activities as centralized organizations. One might argue that 
networks, as transitory and shifting coalitions, do not need long-term planning or 
that their strength is that this “planning” is distributed throughout the network.  
But in this case, the network can no more be said to plan than a market can be 
said to plan the distribution of the resources that flow through it. In any event, 
networks that aspire to be something more than transitory (can transitory 
networks produce fundamental political change?) will suffer from their lack of a 
strategic planning capability. This will decrease the advantage that their 
adaptability offers them. On the other hand, the possibility of having a robust 
strategic planning capability helps offset the long-term risk of extinction that 
centralized organizations suffer from because of their impaired ability to sense 
their environment and change accordingly. 
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With regard to strategic planning, the liability that centralized organizations 
function under is not so much in doing such planning, although this too may be a 
problem if the planning must occur among several centralized organizations, as 
in implementing it. Centralized organizations are notorious for not playing well 
together. Hence, the long-standing concerns and complaints about the lack of 
cooperation and coordination among the organizations that make up the national 
security apparatus of the U.S. government.37 Given the important advantages that 
centralized organizations provide, the solution to this problem of inter-
organizational cooperation should not diminish those advantages. It should 
somehow produce a squared circle. It should respect the authority and turf 
consciousness necessary to produce effective military officers, diplomats, law 
enforcement and public health officers, firefighters, and spies, and the 
perspectives and initiatives they produce, which are partial, but necessarily and 
advantageously so (for example, military force is often at best only part of a 
solution but someone should specialize in advising about its use and employing it 
effectively). Simultaneously, the solution should limit this authority and turf 
consciousness sufficiently to produce integrated and effective responses to the 
problems we face.  Simply decentralizing or networking is unlikely to do this.  
Despite the impossibility of squaring a circle, it has occurred at least once and 
might be made to happen more systematically.38 
The analysis of terrorism and networks suggests some more specific strategies, 
both short- and long-term. If our ability to affect mobilization and recruitment is 
limited in the short-term, we are likely to face a prolonged struggle. In this case, 
we should emphasize limiting the damage to ourselves that might occur during 
this struggle. If we are likely to confront militant Islamists for some time, then we 
should do our best to make sure that they can do us as little harm as possible.  
The greatest damage they can do would come from their use of weapons of mass 
destruction, principally biological or nuclear weapons of some sort.  
Consequently, our greatest efforts should now be spent on stopping the 
proliferation of those weapons and the materials that can make them.  The short-
term payoff in security is likely to be greater from counterproliferation than from 
the effort to capture or kill high-value targets (HVT).   
One might object that it is both necessary and possible to simultaneously 
target HVT and stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Indeed, 
targeting HVT might be one of the best ways to stop proliferation.  In addition, 
effective measures against HVT and even the rank-and-file members of 
organizations will impair all the operational capabilities of those that threaten us.  
This is true but, as we have argued, the strength of our opponent’s recruitment 
and mobilization networks poses a limit to the effectiveness of targeting HVT.  
We should also recognize that there is likely to be a tension between 
counterproliferation and targeting: counterproliferation puts a premium on 
multilateral cooperation; targeting HVTs will often require unilateral action that 
will make multilateral action on other issues more difficult to achieve.39 At a 
minimum, we will face trade-offs between counterproliferation and targeting 
HVT.  When we do, the analysis of our opponent’s networks argues for putting 
the emphasis in the short-term on counterproliferation.    
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Putting an emphasis in the short-term on the multilateralism necessary for 
counterproliferation might also produce some long-term benefits. Lack of 
strategic command and control and thus the misuse of violence is one reason why 
the al Qaeda movement has not prospered, why it has lost support among the 
Muslim masses rather than gained it as it hoped to.40 That the militant Islamists 
have not suffered or the United States not benefited more from this declining 
support is owing largely to the loss of support that the United States has also 
suffered over the past several years.41  An emphasis on counterproliferation and 
multilateralism could be a significant part of the long-term effort to build support 
for the United States and its allies, especially if the conflicts in Iraq are resolved 
and the American presence there diminishes. The prospects for this approach 
look good. The same polls that reveal decreasing support for the militant 
Islamists show broad support, even in the Islamic world, for ideas (democracy, 
capitalism, and globalization) that are more congenial to the United States than 
to its enemies. Simply emphasizing these ideas is unlikely to be decisive, 
however.  We may be engaged in a struggle for public opinion and thus in a war 
of ideas, but especially in such a war, actions speak louder than words. 
Remembering this and acting accordingly will allow the greatest possible 
opportunity for our opponents to suffer from the isolation, insecurity, strategic 
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Paramilitary Terrorism: A Neglected Threat 
Bill Tallen 
At 0830 on an otherwise normal autumn morning, a wave of violence erupts without 
warning at locations across the American heartland, targeting schools and 
schoolchildren. Improvised explosives detonate in sidewalk trash bins; school buses 
are bombed; lone snipers target campuses and first responders in hit and run attacks. 
As confusion and panic spread from local venues to the national consciousness via the 
twenty-four-hour news media, a band of armed terrorists take over an elementary 
school in a small Midwestern city. City and county SWAT officers respond to the scene 
before the scope of the event is clear; trained to respond to a Columbine-like active-
shooter incident, they stage a hasty assault which is bloodily repulsed.  
Executing a score of adult hostages as evidence of their resolve, the terrorists then 
herd hundreds of schoolchildren and staff into the school gymnasium, which they 
prepare with explosives. They upload images of their action onto the Internet. Their 
postings identify the perpetrators as al Qa’ida-affiliated jihadists. Intelligence from the 
police perimeter indicates thirty or more fighters, with military small arms, explosives, 
and heavy weapons, rapidly improving their defenses. 
The terrorists announce their intention to execute their hostages, and their 
willingness to accept ‘martyrdom,’ in the event of another assault or if the U.S. 
government does not take immediate steps to meet their single, non-negotiable 
demand: withdrawal of all American forces from Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, 
and the rest of the House of Islam. 
 
The scenario above is loosely based on the seizure of Beslan School #1 in the Russian 
republic of North Ossetia in 2004, where over a thousand hostages were taken, and 
hundreds of schoolchildren and other innocents were ultimately killed by Chechen 
terrorists.1 This attack was conducted by terrorists using conventional weapons and 
tactics, and required technical expertise less challenging and far more common than the 
piloting skills that guided commercial jets into American buildings on September 11, 
2001.     
The Beslan siege lasted three days before ending in massive bloodshed during an 
assault by government forces – very unlike the instantaneous effects and protracted 
aftermath that characterize suicide terrorism. The attackers took physical control of 
high value assets (for what assets are more valuable, in both real and symbolic terms, 
than our children?), exploited their act for propaganda value, assaulted and murdered 
hostages throughout the siege, and threatened yet worse consequences if their 
impossible demands were not met by the Russian government. Although we can only 
speculate regarding their ultimate intent, which was pre-empted by the government 
forces’ emergency assault, the final outcome in Beslan was terrible enough. 
Related scenarios in a U.S. setting are not difficult to construct, applying similar 
means of attack against a range of soft targets of great iconic, political, or economic 
value. Attacks on better-protected targets such as nuclear power plants, nuclear 
materials shipments, or seats of government are generally considered less likely, 
although surveillance and reconnaissance are known to occur, and some of these harder 
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targets may actually be more vulnerable to seizure and exploitation by paramilitary 
forces than they are to suicide terrorism.    
From the standpoint of preparedness and response planning, such scenarios bear 
little resemblance to the Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD) scenarios that command 
so much of our national attention. Assaults by armed groups, employing improvised 
explosive devices (IED) as enablers or force multipliers rather than the primary 
mechanisms of attack, are commonplace tactics of terrorists and insurgents worldwide. 
By contrast, effective WMD attacks, no matter how theoretically attractive to terrorists, 
and how extreme their potential consequences, remain so far the stuff of fiction. While 
paramilitary attacks may not offer first-order effects (casualties and physical damage) 
equivalent to those of large-scale WMD, their psychological and strategic impact – and 
thus their appeal as quintessential acts of terror – may be enormous.2 
WMD terrorism against U.S. targets may be less likely than more conventional forms 
of attack. Preparedness and defense against terrorism is a risk-management exercise, 
and the calculus of likelihood versus consequence – of most dangerous versus most 
likely – will be ignored at our great peril. The threat of WMD terrorism has led logically 
to a heavy emphasis on prevention by the intelligence and law enforcement 
communities.  But in the event that prevention fails, WMD terrorism scenarios leave 
little scope for intervention, as the execution phase would likely be brief and spectacular. 
For this reason, policy efforts and the allocation of resources have focused heavily upon 
consequence management and forensics. This tendency is further reinforced by 
America’s recent experience of natural and man-made catastrophes (e.g. Hurricane 
Katrina and the California fires of 2007), and the structures and processes of 
consequence management address both terror and non-terror scenarios. The fixation of 
official attention and resources upon WMD terrorism, and upon consequence 
management more generally, has left America ill-prepared to respond quickly and 
effectively to a terrorist paramilitary attack, which may be far more likely than an 
apocalyptic WMD scenario. Measures should be taken to narrow this gap in 
preparedness before it can be exploited by our intelligent, opportunistic enemies. 
LIKE A DEER IN THE HEADLIGHTS 
Although there is informed debate over the attractiveness of WMD to al Qa’ida and its 
jihadist affiliates, the specter of WMD attack has led U.S. homeland security policy, 
planning, organization, and operations to concentrate overwhelmingly on either 
preventing or mitigating the consequences of such attacks. 3  The technical, law 
enforcement, and intelligence challenges of prevention, and the massive costs and 
organizational requirements of consequence management, have dominated the 
attention, efforts, and assets of the interagency community charged with homeland 
security. The national trauma of Hurricane Katrina in 2005 diverted official attention 
from terrorism as a causative agent, but reinforced the fixation on consequence 
management. Agencies charged with response to domestic terrorism are largely the 
same that have been mandated, since Katrina, to better prepare for the aftermath of 
future natural disasters. 
Since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks brought a sense of urgency to U.S. 
counterterrorist (CT) planning, a large body of official policy and doctrine has emerged. 
While successive generations of guidance show increasing sophistication in many areas, 
they are quite consistent in ignoring modalities of terrorist attack other than WMD, 
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isolated IEDs, and suicide terrorism. The two latter categories receive minimal attention, 
and in any case they share a salient characteristic of WMD attacks: we either prevent 
them or clean up and investigate in the aftermath. A selective review of the literature 
provides illustrative examples. 
Homeland Security Presidential Directive-5 (HSPD-5) in 2003 provided course 
corrections and guidance for most subsequent efforts in the field of federal emergency 
preparedness. It called for a National Incident Management System (NIMS) to guide the 
response to domestic incidents “regardless of cause, size, or complexity.”4 It required 
the development of a national response plan to “integrate Federal Government domestic 
prevention, preparedness, response, and recovery plans into one all-discipline, all-
hazards plan.” 5  Significantly, it directed that crisis management and consequence 
management, previously treated as separate yet related functions, be approached 
henceforth as an integrated whole.6 Conflating terrorist attacks with natural or other 
manmade disasters, and failing to differentiate response to an ongoing incident from 
mitigation of its after-effects, HSPD-5 set the tone for future policy and planning. 
The National Response Plan (NRP) was first promulgated in 2004, was later revised 
to address shortfalls identified in the Hurricane Katrina response, and is now being 
supplanted by the National Response Framework (NRF).7 Both documents consistently 
profile the terrorist threat as a nexus of suicide terrorism and WMD – 9/11 writ large – 
reflecting an already pervasive, and entirely logical, emphasis on prevention as the first 
line of defense. They pay scant attention to resolving an ongoing crisis of a non-WMD 
nature, in the event that prevention fails. Both the NRP and NRF are devoted primarily 
to consequence management, either of WMD attacks or natural disasters.  
The lack of attention paid to resolution of an ongoing terrorist incident is also evident 
in the National Planning Scenarios, designed to provide focus for exercises and 
contingency planning by all levels of government.8 These fifteen scenarios include two 
natural disasters, an outbreak of pandemic influenza, and twelve terrorist attacks: one 
improvised nuclear detonation, one radiological dispersion device, four biological and 
four chemical attacks, one cyber, one radiological, and one attack using multiple 
conventional explosives. In several scenarios, terrorists conduct multiple simultaneous 
or closely sequenced attacks, at varying distances from one another. Effects, especially 
in the biological and radiological attack scenarios, are spread over time depending on 
levels of transmissibility or exposure, but attack execution is essentially instantaneous, 
and the scope of government response is limited to consequence management and 
criminal investigation in the aftermath.9 Nowhere in the National Planning Scenarios is 
there a requirement for a tactical response to resolve an ongoing situation or disrupt 
terrorist actions in progress.  
With only rare exceptions, other DOD and Department of Homeland Security (DHS) 
guidance describe a terrorist threat based primarily on mass-casualty WMD attacks.10 
While the threat of terrorist use of IEDs on a less apocalyptic scale is gaining traction in 
recent guidance, attention is still directed overwhelmingly to either prevention or post-
attack measures.11  
Nothing in this argument is meant to denigrate the importance of criminal 
investigation in the aftermath of an attack, nor of the substantial and thus far successful 
efforts of the intelligence and law enforcement communities to prevent major acts of 
domestic terrorism. While these are important and worthy efforts, a fixation upon WMD 
terrorism has combined with the recurring national experience of other manmade or 
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natural disasters to focus planning efforts and resources to a dangerous degree on the 
challenges of prevention, investigation, and consequence management. When 
deterrence, detection, and prevention fail, we will face enemies that must be engaged 
and defeated – missions with a very different set of requirements.   
COMMAND AND CONTROL  
Unity of command and clearly defined command and support relationships, across a 
wide spectrum of responding agencies, would be essential in the event of a time-
sensitive and ongoing terrorist incident. The NRF and other national response guidance 
offer an architecture for command and control (C2) that could well prove cumbersome, 
confusing, and unresponsive in such a crisis, however sensitive it may be to political and 
statutory relationships, and however workable under the less constrained timelines of 
disaster response or consequence management. 
A terrorist incident beyond the response capabilities of local and state government – 
which a Beslan-like attack would certainly be – would trigger requests for federal 
assistance and invoke federal guidance identifying the Department of Justice, and more 
specifically the FBI, as lead federal agency. The water is muddied somewhat by the 
designation of the Department of Homeland Security as lead agency for coordination of 
incident response generally, across all levels of government.12 It is made no clearer by 
DOD’s status as lead agency for homeland defense: the seam separating homeland 
defense from homeland security is not well defined, particularly in the context of an 
ongoing attack by foreign-based terrorists.13    
Planning guidance identifies these seams and ambiguities as strengths, which they 
might well be, if national decision makers have the time and situational awareness to 
capitalize on the flexibility and adaptability of a vaguely defined system, tailoring it to 
the exigencies of the moment.14 In the critical early stages of a terrorist incident this 
ambiguity may instead challenge the nation’s ability to produce a coordinated, effective 
response.  
Critical real-time intelligence, requests and authorizations for assistance, deployment 
orders, and assignment of command responsibility must flow through the “wiring 
diagrams” of NIMS among local agencies and three federal departments (DHS, DOJ, 
and DOD) with overlapping responsibilities, and then to their component agencies, 
services, and commands. It may be a gross understatement to suggest that this may not 
occur smoothly in the early hours of a crisis. 
A Request for Assistance (RFA) by military forces, for instance, can originate from a 
state governor’s office, or from a federal agency on scene. It will travel through federal 
law enforcement channels to the attorney general, from there to the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense for approval, and then to U.S. Northern Command 
(USNORTHCOM), which only then receives operational control of active duty forces 
from other combatant commands.15 If the forces allocated for response include National 
Guard – which would likely be mobilizing simultaneously under state authority – 
further coordination of their status and chain of command will be necessary. There are 
ample opportunities in this process for confusion and delay, which could have 
particularly (and literally) fatal consequences in an ongoing terrorist incident of the type 
anticipated here.16 
NIMS and the Incident Command System promote the concept of Unified Command, 
a tool for consensus decision-making that can help defuse conflict and integrate civilian 
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agencies with overlapping responsibilities and jurisdictions.17 Military forces, however, 
do not operate under the Unified Command structure at all, and each civilian agency, 
while participating, maintains a separate chain of command for its own forces, so 
Unified Command at best provides only unity of effort.  
Under the conditions of ambiguity, overlapping responsibilities, compressed 
timelines, and cascading consequences that will prevail in the event of an ongoing 
terrorist attack, mission success will require high levels of coordination, shared 
assumptions, and good will among a multitude of agencies unaccustomed to 
cooperation in a crisis. Higher echelons and tactical responders alike will require true 
unity of command, but there is no construct in NIMS that will enable it.  
The NIMS command structure has proven useful, or at least usable, in the 
consequence management scenarios for which it was primarily designed. When rapid, 
forceful, coordinated tactical response is required to resolve an ongoing terrorist action, 
convoluted routing of requests for assistance, parallel chains of command, and the 
consensus decision making of Unified Command will likely fall short of the need. 
TIME, SPACE, AND FORCE 
One lesson starkly evident in the aftermath of Beslan is that tactical response to such an 
incident requires discipline, proficiency, and precision. To deny an adversary time to 
consolidate his position, cause further damage or loss of life, or exploit the propaganda 
value of his action, the response must also be swift – measured in hours, not days. Rapid 
deployment of tactical forces capable of resolving the situation is therefore vital.18 
Local law enforcement agencies (LLEA) would respond quickly, but in most cases 
lack the ability to defeat numerous, well-prepared adversaries like those that attacked 
Beslan in 2004.19 Hostage rescue or asset recovery on the scale envisioned by this 
scenario is beyond the capability of most LLEA SWAT (Special Weapons and Tactics) 
teams.20 Most local and state agencies field teams composed of patrol officers, who 
receive additional specialized training and equipment, but train and operate as a team 
only on an occasional basis, and require time to assemble and orient to a crisis situation. 
These teams seldom consist of more than a dozen assaulters, with varying degrees of 
support by snipers, breachers, and other specialists.21 Some departments do field full-
time, well-equipped and highly proficient SWAT teams that can respond quickly and in 
strength to local incidents with a high level of cohesion and tactical proficiency. But even 
these teams would be challenged by the paradigm shift involved in confronting 
paramilitary terrorism. Whether full-time or part-time, LLEA SWAT teams quite 
understandably tend to focus their resources and training time on the scenarios they 
most frequently confront, such as high risk warrant service, active shooters, and 
barricaded suspects.   
Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP), and rules for the use of force which are 
suitable, legal, and constitutionally defensible for these situations, are often dangerously 
incompatible with the requirements of combat against multiple, dedicated, heavily 
armed and fortified terrorists.22 For instance, the 1999 Columbine school shootings 
showed the inadequacy of the common SWAT practice of containment, intelligence 
gathering, negotiation, and deliberate assault planning when faced with an active 
shooter scenario. Training for such incidents now often stresses the necessity for rapid 
intervention by small elements at the earliest possible moment. While this may be a 
realistic and necessary response to a rampage by one or two criminal sociopaths, it 
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would fail catastrophically, and could easily provoke a hugely disproportionate response, 
if the attackers were an organized paramilitary group. The Beslan-like paramilitary 
terrorism scenario is most emphatically not a typical SWAT incident, and will not be 
resolved by the methods and resources available to local law enforcement. 
The FBI represents the next echelon of response, but it is unlikely that the Bureau 
could quickly field a tactical capability commensurate with its authority. Its field offices 
in fifty-six U.S. cities can mobilize SWAT teams composed of special agents who 
volunteer for this ancillary duty and receive appropriate specialized training. Team size 
varies, and at the larger field offices may include as many as twenty agents, organized 
into sniper teams, breachers, and assaulters. As with most LLEA teams, however, FBI 
SWAT team personnel have other primary duties and are seldom afforded the 
opportunity to train together as a tactical team more than a few days a month. A larger 
regional SWAT team can be assembled from these field office elements, but assembly 
alone could require days, and a composite regional team is even less likely to be capable 
of fully-integrated tactical operations without yet more time for training and rehearsal. 
Although they have proven adequate for most of the federal law enforcement 
contingencies for which they were created, FBI SWAT teams may offer only a limited 
enhancement of local capabilities in time-sensitive terrorism scenarios.23  
 The FBI’s Hostage Rescue Team (HRT), the tactical component of its Critical 
Incident Response Group, is a large, full-time tactical team – a highly capable, Tier One 
national asset – but its ability to respond effectively to paramilitary terrorism is subject 
to the tyrannies of time, space, and force. Without specific prior warning of an imminent 
attack, it would not be deployed forward from its base in Virginia. It could therefore 
require many hours of air and surface travel to be mission ready at an incident site, 
particularly one in the central or western United States, even after the processing of a 
request for assistance and HRT receipt of alert and deployment orders. The HRT lacks 
sufficient strength and redundancy in both operators and in its command, planning, 
support, and transportation capabilities, to respond to multiple attacks or diversions in 
dispersed locations, a requirement it might well face in the event of a well-planned 
terrorist attack.24    
Other federal agencies possess tactical teams with varying degrees of proficiency and 
availability, but these are mostly relatively small, part-time, ad hoc units like the FBI 
SWAT teams. They are neither trained nor held in readiness for quick response or for 
missions outside their agencies’ normal jurisdictions and operational profiles. 
Designated military Quick Response Forces (QRF), as well as the tactical teams of 
installation security forces, can provide support to civil authorities, given either 
completion of the RFA process described earlier, or a local commander’s determination 
that immediate response on his own authority is necessary. Few of these forces, however, 
are properly trained or equipped for counterterrorist operations, and they would 
introduce additional interoperability and chain-of-command issues to offset any 
incremental advantage they offer, beyond assistance in perimeter control and other 
supporting roles.  
A few DOD special operations forces (SOF) possess robust counterterrorist 
capabilities, but their ability to respond effectively to domestic incidents of paramilitary 
terrorism would be constrained by deployment time, distance, and force size in much 
the same way as the HRT. The demands of wartime operations overseas further limit the 
availability and readiness of these military assets. Forces tasked with domestic civil 
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support in terrorism contingencies are unlikely to be fully dedicated to training and 
preparation for that mission, carrying it instead as an ancillary responsibility during 
periods of reconstitution, while rotated stateside out of combat zone deployments. 
The Posse Comitatus Act or PCA (Title 18, U.S. Code, Section 1385) limits direct 
involvement of most Title 10 (active duty) military forces in domestic law enforcement.25 
The extent to which it restricts the utility of military assets in domestic CT roles is by no 
means resolved. As noted earlier, the seam between homeland security – where civilian 
agencies lead and counterterrorism is seen as a law enforcement function – and 
homeland defense missions – where DOD leads and possesses considerable freedom of 
action – is imprecise and largely untested by real world applications. Some DOD 
guidance claims that statutory exceptions to PCA, or direct presidential authorization, 
will result in minimal restriction on its forces’ freedom to assist law enforcement even 
during civil support missions. Other guidance is less sanguine, and the boundaries and 
authorities are not portrayed consistently.26    
Academic studies, as well as common perceptions among civil authorities and even 
within the DOD community, reflect the same ambivalence displayed in DOD guidance.27  
Readiness of local authorities or lead federal agencies to request DOD tactical assets, to 
integrate them rapidly and effectively, and to entrust them with local command of 
tactical operations would require a remarkable and apparently not universal degree of 
confidence in the legal basis for their participation. It would also require a willingness to 
renounce jurisdictional authority and organizational rivalry and distrust.  
Military CT teams in a domestic role would find themselves in an operating 
environment very unlike those that pertain to most overseas war-fighting missions. 
While their training and operational methods would in many respects be better suited to 
the requirements of the situation than those of domestic law enforcement agencies, legal 
and constitutional restraints will intrude. They would be called upon to work in close 
cooperation, on compressed timelines, with civilian agencies that do not share their 
doctrine, equipment, TTP, or C2 structure and methods.  
Conflicts over jurisdiction, responsibility, and capacity among responding local 
agencies, the FBI, and military assets are a form of friction that must be expected – 
particularly in the absence of frequent joint and interagency tactical response exercises 
involving critical stakeholders. These stakeholders include LLEA nationwide – not just 
in a few high-profile “showcase” locations – as well as all FBI field offices, the National 
Guard of every state, and the full range of Title 10 (active duty military) forces discussed 
earlier.28     
In summary, tactical teams that could respond effectively to a terrorist paramilitary 
threat within the United States are limited in number, size, interoperability, and the 
speed with which they could respond to many potential incident sites. They would be 
hard-pressed to respond to multiple simultaneous or closely sequenced contingencies – 
a limitation that could be exploited by an adversary’s use of diversions or secondary 
efforts. Their ability to coordinate their actions with supporting agencies in a hostage 
rescue or asset recovery mission against significant opposition, in a domestic 
environment, remains largely untested. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
The foregoing discussion has identified three gaps in the nation’s preparedness to meet 
a paramilitary terrorist attack on U.S. soil: inattention to the threat in scenarios, 
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exercises, and guidance that drive training and preparation at all levels of government; 
limited availability and slow deployment times of capable CT units; and the 
unwieldiness of the command and control structure which would authorize and 
coordinate their employment. In the context of an ongoing competition for time, 
resources, and attention several recommendations are offered.  
Great returns could be achieved from a modest investment, by reorienting the 
considerable efforts of the homeland security community to an approach more inclusive 
of the full range of terrorist threats. Even without major force structure, funding, or top-
down C2 and doctrinal changes (although all of these may ultimately be necessary), the 
gaps in preparedness may be narrowed considerably. Simply widening the focus of 
exercises to include paramilitary terrorist attack scenarios would highlight areas 
requiring policy attention, identify work-arounds, and prepare key decision makers for 
their roles in this type of situation. Proper critiques of such exercises, and wide, effective 
dissemination of lessons learned to agencies at all levels from local police to DHS, DOD, 
and DOJ would be critical, and are the most often neglected part of the training process. 
After-action reviews must be brutally honest, fully documented, and devoid of blame. 
Participants must set aside egos, as well as interagency rivalries, and welcome the use of 
their failures – along with their successes – to educate their counterparts nationwide.  
Three more components of a likely solution emerge from the preceding analysis. 
Implementation will require careful consideration of where the domestic 
counterterrorist mission should reside, but should be shaped by the following 
assumptions: 
• Dedicated, full-time federal counterterrorist units without routine law 
enforcement duties or orientation can best provide the key tactical competencies 
required to resolve an ongoing incident.  
• Streamlined command and control, cutting the Gordian Knot of the NRF 
authorization process, could promise rapid commitment of CT units in a crisis.  
• Regional basing could drastically reduce deployment time to all parts of the 
country, compared to the current reliance on centralized assets located on the 
coasts, while also promoting area familiarity and interoperability with local, state, 
and other federal agencies in each region. 
A Military Solution 
Existing studies of the DOD role in homeland security, much like the official literature, 
focus primarily on support to civil authorities in natural or manmade disasters, and on 
WMD terrorism scenarios. Certain of their recommendations could nonetheless 
contribute to improving counterterrorist capabilities. These include the constitution of 
standing, regionally-based response units with a primary civil support mission, each 
based on an Army Brigade Combat Team or a Marine Air Ground Task Force, 
substantially augmented with specialties such as Military Police, Engineers, and Civil 
Affairs from both active and reserve components. To address the deficiency in CT 
capabilities posed by this analysis, they might also include dedicated CT teams drawn 
from U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). One study suggests a total of 
three of these reinforced brigades.29 Another more ambitiously proposes one for each of 
the ten Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) regions.30   
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Both studies conceive of these response forces as full-time, federally funded Title 10 
forces, assigned to USNORTHCOM. Under the current system, USNORTHCOM only 
receives operational control over active and reserve component formations during a 
crisis, in response to a Request for Assistance. While active duty forces assigned 
permanently to USNORTHCOM could presumably respond more quickly once 
committed, processing the RFA through civilian interagency channels could still delay 
their commitment, despite their relative proximity to an incident site and their 
simplified chain of command. 
Issues relating to Title 10 versus state active duty or Title 32 status for National 
Guard components of the proposed regional response forces are not particularly 
relevant for their counterterrorist components. Maintenance of proficiency in complex 
perishable skills and the requirement for swift deployment in a crisis both argue for full-
time, Title 10 active duty status for the CT teams. For Title 10 forces, however, the 
ambiguity discussed earlier concerning legal authority – is the mission homeland 
defense or support to civilian law enforcement – would still beg resolution.  
The advantages in response time gained from regional basing would be somewhat 
offset by the difficulties of ensuring consistent, high quality training and support for 
dispersed SOF elements no longer centrally based or assigned to USSOCOM. Regional 
reproduction of the training facilities and infrastructure of USSOCOM is unlikely, 
suggesting either reduced opportunities for training or regular travel out of region to 
training sites. Team size would have to be large enough to maintain a capable, 
responsive element on call for crisis deployments, while accommodating training and 
administrative requirements. These would not be small teams. 
Reliance on DOD for improved domestic CT capabilities would also require: funding 
for further expansion of SOF, in order to avoid a negative impact on war fighting 
capabilities and commitments; fencing these units from diversion to other missions; 
time to identify and assign cadre, and then to recruit, train, and attain operational 
capability for new CT teams; and finding or improving appropriate basing facilities with 
ready access to air and ground transportation covering the assigned region. These 
requirements would also pertain more broadly to the larger project of standing up 
brigade-size regional response forces, and could introduce significant delays in 
implementation.  
A Civil Approach 
A better solution to this problem may be found in an expansion and redeployment of 
existing FBI counterterrorist capabilities. The existing HRT offers a model for an 
expanded, regionally-based federal CT force. Depending on how regional boundaries 
were drawn, two or three “cloned” teams resembling the HRT in strength and 
organization would constitute a significant improvement in capabilities and 
responsiveness, for a relatively modest investment in 200-300 additional special agents 
(plus administrative and support echelons as required). New teams could be built on 
cadre recruited from field office SWAT teams and the existing HRT, and augmented as 
necessary from those sources until additional recruitment and training filled their ranks. 
If these teams were dedicated to the counterterrorist mission, and not utilized in other 
law enforcement functions, recruiting would not be limited to experienced special 
agents but could seek outside talent; and their training, rules of engagement, and TTP 
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could reflect the dire and unique circumstances of combat against paramilitary 
terrorists in a domestic operating environment. 
Given the FBI’s existing authority as lead federal agency for response to domestic 
terrorism, regional CT teams under its direct control would offer a simplified C2 
structure and minimize jurisdictional ambiguity and the frictions attendant to multi-
agency operations. They would relieve DOD special operations forces of responsibility 
for domestic CT missions in all but the gravest circumstances.  
Such an expansion of agent end-strength, and the necessary support staff and 
infrastructure, would require a significant increase in FBI budget, but not a 
disproportionate one in the context of other ongoing increases in federal law 
enforcement manning and capability (for instance in the effort to improve border 
protection). Shifting current efforts or personnel without expanding end-strength, 
beyond the use of existing technical expertise and tactical leadership for cadre, could 
only damage the Bureau’s ability to conduct other vital tasks. Rather than a diversion of 
resources from other efforts, this should be undertaken as a necessary increase in the 
nation’s investment in security from terrorist threats. 
CONCLUSION 
In the gap between prevention (where we stake many of our hopes and count many 
successes) and consequence management (where we currently devote a preponderance 
of our resources) lies the risk of a technically unsophisticated  paramilitary attack on 
assets we are not prepared to lose, and which might offer tremendous leverage to a 
ruthless and dedicated adversary. It may be time to heed our own counsel, as stated in 
JP 3-07.2, Antiterrorism: 
Terrorists choose their targets deliberately based on the weaknesses they observe 
in our defenses and in our preparations. They can balance the difficulty in 
successfully executing a particular attack against the magnitude of loss it might 
cause. They can monitor our media and listen to our policymakers as our Nation 
discusses how to protect itself - and adjust their plans accordingly. Where we 
insulate ourselves from one form of attack, they can shift and focus on another 
exposed vulnerability. We must defend ourselves against a wide range of means 
and methods of attack.31 
Political, legal, and budgetary considerations will continue to bound the art of the 
possible; there can be no perfect or impenetrable defense. Prioritization of threats to 
homeland security will remain a calculus of probability and consequence; but the threat 
we neglect may well prove to be the one most appealing to the adversary. 
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George Kennan’s Ghost 
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Review of Faith, Reason, and the War Against Jihadism 
by George Weigel (Doubleday, 2007)  
 
George Kennan’s ghost haunts the halls of Washington, faculty offices across the 
land, and embassies around the world. As author of the “Long Telegram from 
Moscow” and the pseudonymous “X” of The Sources of Soviet Conduct, Kennan 
articulated the core character of America’s adversary at the beginning of the Cold 
War.  Moreover he described the adversary with such clarity that when he set out 
strategies for securing U.S. interests it seems – at least in retrospect – as if the 
Red Sea parted and we merely walked across on dry ground. 
Where is our “Long Email from Baghdad?”  Our Sources of Terrorist Conduct?  
Where is our wise and persuasive statement of fundamental policy? Where is our 
Kennan? Our Moses? 
When “X” appeared in a 1947 issue of Foreign Affairs, Kennan’s policy 
leadership seemed preeminent. Barely three years later Kennan had lost much of 
his influence and expressed frustration as Paul Nitze misapplied Kennan’s 
strategy in NSC-68.1 To some it seemed the nuanced insight of Moses was 
succeeded by an aggressive campaign of latter day Joshuas. 
 
In his valuable new book George Weigel writes:  
The United States needs the equivalent of an NSC-68 for the twenty-first 
century struggle against jihadism, an alternative conception of the human 
future carried by a messianic creed and advanced by ruthless means. 
Which, come to think of it, was precisely what Dean Acheson and Paul 
Nitze were facing in 1950. If they could see clearly and plan prudently 
then, there is no reason why we cannot do the same now. (Page 94) 
Weigel tells us what he sees. It is clear to Weigel that jihadism is an irrational 
worldview rooted in a fundamentally non-rational – perhaps anti-rational – 
theological framework. Just as Kennan pointed toward the Soviet Union’s 
dismissal of objective truth as a key to understanding it – or as Nitze wrote of the 
Soviet will to absolute power – Weigel argues that we must fully recognize the 
irrational nature of our present adversary. 
In previous works, especially American Interests, American Purpose: Moral 
Reasoning and U.S. Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1989), Weigel has critiqued 
ideologues of both left and right as simplistic and, ultimately, destined for failure.  
In Faith, Reason, and the War Against Jihadism he once again points to a 
rigorous application of reason as the principal means for advancing the Good. He 
writes: 
                                                           
1 NSC-68 or National Security Council Report 68, entitled United States Objectives and Programs for 
National Security was adopted on April 14, 1950 and remained a pillar of national policy for most of the 
Cold War. 
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Understanding the inevitable irony, pathos, and tragedy of history; being 
alert to the dangers of unintended consequences; maintaining a robust 
skepticism about schemes of human perfection (especially when politics is 
the chosen instrument of salvation); cherishing democracy without 
worshiping it…remain essential intellectual grounding for anyone 
thinking seriously about U.S. foreign policy in the war against jihadism. 
(Page 77) 
As befits a distinguished Catholic theologian, Weigel organizes his text 
around fifteen lessons, or what Thomas Aquinas might have called 
propositions.  These include: 
Lesson 1: The great human questions, including the great questions of public 
life, are ultimately theological. 
Lesson 8: Genuine realism in foreign policy takes wickedness seriously, yet 
avoids premature closure in its thinking about the possibilities of positive 
change in world politics. 
Lesson 11: Cultural self-confidence is indispensable to victory in the long-term 
struggle against jihadism. 
In his Summa, Aquinas engaged a proposition by acknowledging the principal 
objections to the statement. Then he dealt with the objections and argued a 
demonstrable proof. Weigel is not attempting a Summa. His subtitle is a Call to 
Action and his aim is to rally rather more than carefully explicate. 
But I worry how accurately Weigel will be read, especially by the most action-
oriented. For example, he begins Lesson 1 with, “How men and women think 
about God – or don’t think about God – has a great deal to do with how they 
envision a just society, and how they determine the appropriate means by which 
to build that society.” (Page 13) I happen to agree. But it strikes me as 
treacherous to assume most readers will fully accept the statement, much less 
perceive the related second-order implications on which much of Weigel’s book 
depends. 
He may be worried as well. A bit later Weigel writes, “Tone deafness to the fact 
that for the overwhelming majority of humanity, religious conviction provides the  
(Weigel’s italics) story line through which life’s meaning is read is, in one sense, a 
by-product of a disinclination to acknowledge the truth of what has become 
something of a cliché: that ‘ideas have consequences.’” (Page 14) It is also true 
that ideas can have complicated pedigrees, surprising relationships, and 
unintended – even counter-intuitive – consequences. The vast majority of 
Americans are self-confessed religious believers. But a religious person may have 
difficulty – may actively resist – empathizing with the religious imagination of 
their adversary. 
Some have argued we should hope for an Islamic Luther or Calvin. Weigel 
seems to suggest an Islamic Aquinas or Erasmus would be more helpful. More 
likely too, I would add. Application of God-given reason will expose religiously 
justified terrorism as unacceptable, even haraam. Weigel argues that faith and 
reason, together, are crucial tools to apply in dealing with our terrorist adversary.  
But do we have sufficient understanding of the tools? Weigel is also author of a 
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best selling biography of Pope John Paul II (Witness to Hope) and a long list of 
serious texts examining the interplay of faith and reason with contemporary 
issues. I wonder if he over-estimates the religious literacy – and religious self-
awareness – of many readers. 
Faith, Reason, and the War Against Jihadism is a little book, only 195 pages 
in an 8x5 inch format reminiscent of a devotional. Short can be good. The “Long 
Telegram” was about six pages of 10-point type. Even NSC-68 only ran to fifty-
eight pages. But both Kennan and Nitze had the advantage of writing for men of 
similar education and worldview who had shared the common experience of 
fighting a World War together. That is not our situation. 
Weigel recognizes he is writing for a more fractured generation.  He describes  
[A] culture far more given to self-deprecation than to critical self-
affirmation. A culture addicted to self-deprecation is unlikely to be able to 
defend its commitments to, say, democracy and the rule of law. A culture 
in which the habit, the virtue, of self-critique and self-correction has 
deteriorated into self-contempt is a culture that is unlikely to be able to 
meet the challenge of a self-confident culture in the war of ideas… We will 
neither deserve victory nor achieve it if we do not deem ourselves and our 
culture worthy of victory. (Pages 110-111) 
Weigel does not give sustained attention to American or Western culture’s 
complicated attitude toward its own religious foundations. Does our self-
deprecation and self-contempt extend to our Judeo-Christian roots?  
An answer is implied. Weigel writes, “A West that has airbrushed from its 
collective memory the contributions of biblical religion to its present freedoms is 
a West that is in a poor position to meet the challenge of a religiously shaped 
alternative reading of the past, present, and future.” (Page 117) This is taken from 
the third and last section of the book entitled “Deserving Victory.” (Part One: 
Understanding the Enemy, Part Two: Rethinking Realism.) Appropriate for a Call 
to Action, this section offers several policy prescriptions. But I was left wondering 
about the cultural, intellectual, and perhaps spiritual preconditions for such 
policies to be effectively implemented. 
Understanding an adversary is advantageous. When we recognize the 
predisposition of our adversary we can better anticipate its targets and methods.  
The same understanding will allow us to better target our own defensive and 
offensive decisions.   
In the case of jihadism Weigel is surely correct that we will not understand our 
adversary unless we engage its religious dimension. He goes on – too quickly, I 
perceive – to argue that Islam should not be seen as one of three related religions.  
His second lesson is: “To speak of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam as the ‘three 
Abrahamic faiths’… obscures rather than illuminates.” (Page 17) He did not 
persuade me on this count. But even accepting for argument’s sake that Islam in 
general and the jihadists in particular are entirely “other” than Jewish or 
Christian, how might Jews, Christians, or their secular cultural cousins begin to 
understand the religious other if not through our own religious experience and 
imagination? 
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What is the state of faith and reason within our own culture? Do we have 
sufficient tools of intellect and empathy regarding our own theology (implicit or 
explicit) to recognize – or differentiate – the religious impulse of our adversary? 
 
I hope Weigel will treat his present “little book” as an annotated outline for his 
own Summa. Like Thomas Aquinas I hope he will begin with first principles – 
some long neglected and even forgotten – and remind us of our intellectual and 
ethical foundations, our whys and therefores, and will make his full case for how 
faith and reason can be good partners in confronting our critical challenges.   
Then I look forward to an equally well-reasoned contra-Weigel emerging in 
response. These are days when we clearly need our own Plato and Aristotle, our 
own Thomas Aquinas versus Siger de Brabant, our own Kennan and our own 
Nitze. It is precisely in the exchange of well-reasoned and divergent thought that 
we claim the advantage over any adversary who seeks to limit freedom of 
thought. The adversary Kennan and Nitze faced and the one we face today are 
radically different. But they share a narrow-minded intolerance for any truth but 
their own.  That is their greatest vulnerability.  
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